Closed circuit television (CCTV) and its application to public safety initiatives:  effectiveness and considerations by Kerr, Colleen (author) et al.
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV) AND ITS  
APPLICATION TO PUBLIC SAFETY INITIATIVES: 
Effectiveness and Considerations 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Colleen Kerr 
 
 
 
 
 
MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL 
FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
University of the Fraser Valley 
 
 
 
 
 
Winter 2009 
 
 
© Colleen Kerr 2009 
UNIVERSITY OF THE FRASER VALLEY 
Winter 2009 
 
 
All rights reserved. This work may not be 
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy 
or other means, without permission of the author. 
 ii 
 
Approval 
 
 
 
Name:   Colleen Kerr 
 
Degree:   Master of Arts in Criminal Justice 
 
Title of Major Paper:   
 
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION (CCTV) AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
PUBLIC SAFETY INITIATIVES:  Effectiveness and Considerations. 
 
 
 
Examining Committee: 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
First Supervisor   Dr. Darryl Plecas 
 
_______________________________________________ 
Second Supervisor   Dr. Irwin Cohen 
 
 
_______________________________________________ 
External Examiner      
 
_______________________________________________ 
CHAIR, Exam Committee      
 
 
 
 
Date Defended/Approved:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to the University 
of the Fraser Valley the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the University 
of the Fraser Valley Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to 
a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf 
or for one of its users.  
 
The author has further granted permission to the University of the Fraser Valley to keep or make a 
digital copy for use in its circulating collection, and, without changing the content, to translate the 
thesis/project or extended essay, if  technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose or 
preservation of the digital work. 
 
The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly 
purposes may be granted by either the author or the Associate Vice-President, Research and 
Graduate Studies. 
 
It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed 
without the author’s written permission. 
 
Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, or any 
multimedia materials forming part of this work, may be granted by the author.  This information may 
be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright 
License. 
 
The original Partial Copyright License attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be 
found in the original bound copy of this work, retained by the University of the Fraser Valley Heritage 
Collection. 
 
 
University of the Fraser Valley 
Abbotsford, B.C. 
 iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Closed circuit television (CCTV) is increasingly being promoted as an intervention for 
use in public settings aimed at reducing crime and fear of crime. This paper explores the 
question of whether or not CCTV actually does what it is being promoted to do, and also 
examines a number of other salient issues related to CCTV, including the privacy 
concerns surrounding its implementation, environmental determinants, such as political 
and media influences which affect public support of CCTV, as well as operational and 
management considerations. The paper emphasizes the value of program evaluation and 
evidence-based approaches as integral pieces which should be included in the decision 
making process by policy makers as well as practitioners when considering CCTV as a 
crime control measure. 
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 1 
Introduction 
In Canada, Closed Circuit Television technology (CCTV) is being considered as 
part of the strategy to prevent crime and the fear of crime. This approach is not new as 
the implementation of CCTV systems has risen steeply over the past decade in the UK. 
CCTV systems are now being considered or are actively in use in Canada in public 
transportation settings, airports, intersections as ‗red light cameras‘, markets, shopping 
malls, universities, government buildings, and public streets. These systems are being 
increasingly promoted for their deterrent value, their ability to promote public safety, 
detection enhancement capabilities, and their usefulness in decreasing police response 
times.  
This major paper focuses on examining CCTV‘s prevalence, effectiveness, and 
implications specific to public street surveillance. The paper is organized to provide an 
overview of the background and rationale of camera surveillance in public safety settings. 
As such, Chapter One begins with a definition of CCTV followed by an examination of 
how CCTV is evolving and experiencing ongoing technological advancements. A 
summary of the following four technological advancements will be provided: (1) 
observation technologies; (2) tracking technologies; (3) recording technologies; and (4) 
identification technologies. A review of the history and prevalence of CCTV video 
surveillance in public safety settings, worldwide, will also be provided.  
Chapter Two will examine the research on whether CCTV reduces crime. This 
chapter explores the general conclusion that the research on CCTV‘s effectiveness for 
reducing crime has produced inconsistent findings. Moreover, the methodological 
problems with the research will be considered. CCTV‘s effect on personal and property 
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crime, and the role of CCTV on crime displacement, will also be examined. This chapter 
also considers the effect of CCTV on fear of crime. It provides an introduction to the 
concept of fear of crime and the difficulties associated with measuring it. Chapter Three 
examines the importance of public expectations, the media, publicity, and political 
pressures on CCTV‘s effectiveness and implementation. Case study examples from three 
Canadian cities will be analyzed to demonstrate the importance of these influences on the 
implementation of CCTV.  
Chapter Four is dedicated to exploring one of the leading arguments against the use 
of CCTV in public safety settings; the potential threat that the system poses to citizens‘ 
privacy rights and civil liberties. In this chapter, the importance that legal scholars and 
justice systems play in the development of regulations and systems designed to guide law 
enforcement‘s use of video surveillance is examined. An overview of recently developed 
Canadian guidelines is also provided in this chapter.  
 Chapter Five is dedicated to issues of training, management, and operational 
policies for the administration of CCTV systems. The UK is a leader in the development 
of CCTV and, as a result, they have emerged as leaders at the forefront of the movement 
to ensure that standards are developed and adhered to. For this reason, the major 
emphasis of this chapter derives from the UK‘s recommendations as outlined in a 
document entitled, ―National CCTV Strategy‖ (2007).  As well, a discussion of the 
importance of evidence-based decision making in the development of programs and the 
value of strong evaluation practices for crime prevention and deterrence initiatives will be 
reviewed.  
 3 
Chapter One:  CCTV and Its Uses 
Any discussion of the prospective implementation of Closed Circuit Television 
surveillance (CCTV) requires that this technology be defined.  For the purpose of this 
paper, CCTV refers to ―electronic monitoring systems which make use of video cameras, 
connected by means of a ‗closed‘ (or non-broadcast) circuit, to capture, collect, record, 
and /or relay visual information about the event-status of a given space over time‖ (Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, 2003: 7).  As identified by the Constitution Project, a liberty 
and security committee based in America that is non-profit and bipartisan, CCTV‘s latest 
advances can be divided according to the following categories: (1) observation 
technologies; (2) recording technologies; (3) tracking technologies; and (4) identification 
technologies. 
Significant advances have occurred in the ability of cameras in the area of 
observation technologies. Earlier systems, as well as many currently used systems, are 
able to ‗see‘ approximately the same distance as the human eye, but with a narrower field 
of view (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007). In 
contrast, the newer systems are able to pan and tilt in a variety of directions by the use of 
controls employed by the operators which can effectively expand the area of coverage as 
well as increase magnification to significantly improve the image detail. ―With a mere 
60-times optical zoom lens, a camera can read the wording on a cigarette packet at 100 
yards‖ (Slobogin, 2002: 72). And, some cities are reportedly deploying cameras capable 
of 400-times magnification (Kinzer, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2004). Other new technologies 
are also enhancing images captured in very low light.  As well, the use of infrared ‗night-
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vision technology‘ can expose images observed in no light (Report of the Constitution 
Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007).  
Specific to recording technologies, the new digital video technologies have better 
recording quality and lower storage costs compared to the older analogue recordings. 
These management improvements are further enhanced by ‗metadata‘ or extra 
information about the recording or the captured images that increases the usefulness of 
the recording (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 
2007). For example, a camera can record information about filming a specific location 
such as date, time, location, and summarized information, such as numbers of vehicles or 
people, as well as specific information about individuals that have been recognized – 
such as numbers of times they have previously visited the location or if they have a 
criminal record. Recorded digital footage data can also be searched more easily than 
analogue footage, and, when combined with the rich metadata, the footage can be 
catalogued into a database that is easily searched for specifics, such as an activity or 
individual, which can be further developed into a ‗digital dossier‘ about the activity or 
individual (Solove, 2002). As well, the data or footage can be directly reviewed for any 
time or location that exists in the database.  
The newer systems and camera networks can also be further enhanced with 
technology that allows the camera to ―track movement in their field of view or across 
networked cameras‖ (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security 
Committee, 2007: 5).  Simple motion detectors can turn the camera on to record when 
movement is detected, and even more advanced systems can track an object moving 
through its field of view. When these features are combined with pan, tilt, and zoom 
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technology, a camera could be set to track a person as they walk the full length of city 
blocks, around corners, or even from a building to a vehicle. Software can also be added 
to perform even more sophisticated tracking, such as recognition of unusual or suspicious 
movement or analysis of information, such as speed, path, and destination.  
In contrast to the popular image of a lone security guard watching a bank of 
grainy monitors, systems commercially available today can provide a unified, 
virtual-reality perspective of a monitored area—similar to the interface of the 
popular Google Earth software—allowing an operator to automatically follow an 
object as it moves from camera view to camera view. In real time or using stored 
data, law enforcement can actively and pervasively track specific individuals or 
activity in large areas, or even be notified if the system detects unusual activity 
(Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007: 5).   
Continual improvements are taking place in the area of automated identification 
software. Prior to these technological advances, law enforcement would typically know 
the identity of the people they were specifically monitoring, or they would seek citizen 
assistance in identifying a suspect caught on video.  This approach is evolving as quickly 
as the technology. For example, footage of license plate numbers can identify specific 
vehicles or the data from these plates can be compared to information in databases of 
stolen plates or vehicle lists for quick analysis. This automated license plate recognition 
(ALPR) technology is being utilized in an increasing number of countries including 
Canada and the UK.  For example, Cohen and Plecas (2007) reviewed the effectiveness 
of ALPR as a strategy identified to keep citizens safe from the risks associated with 
unlicensed, prohibited, or uninsured drivers in British Columbia, Canada.  Their report 
stated that while the use of ALPR ―can assist in the identification of stolen vehicles as 
well as unlicensed and/or prohibited drivers,  ALPR can also assist the police to identify 
persons of interest associated with other criminal activity‖ (Cohen and Plecas, 2007: 1).  
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Another technological advancement has implemented radio frequency identification in 
employee badges and ―E-ZPass‖ systems which can be combined with surveillance 
systems (Glancy, 1995). As well, facial recognition systems continue to improve in 
quality and reliability (Shachtman, 2006).  Advancements such as these are becoming 
increasingly sought after by law enforcement agencies hoping to examine video footage 
for suspects in a similar way that fingerprints from a crime scene are compared against a 
database of criminal fingerprints. In effect, facial recognition may eventually be used to 
track and catalogue an individual‘s movements while under surveillance. Members of the 
US Congress have expressed an interest in utilizing biometric identification, such as iris 
scanners and facial recognition, to categorize and identify individuals on watch lists 
specific to terrorism (Festa, 2003). Smaller scale facial recognition and iris scanner 
systems are already in place in a joint program operating in Canada and the US, where 
iris scanners are being used for previously cleared individuals in the Nexus program. The 
Nexus program is one which allows for frequent travellers who are pre-screened through 
a security and finger printing process, to use a dedicated traffic lane for access between 
the two countries. A new expansion to this program was launched as the first of its kind 
in North America in Vancouver, B.C. on November 30, 2004. This initiative was 
announced as a joint pilot project at a meeting in Ottawa with Department of Homeland 
Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, and Canadian Deputy Prime Minister, Anne McClellan, 
and was initially developed for use at airports for pre-approved, low-risk, frequent air 
travelers.  What is unique about this pilot project is that the process has been expanded to 
allow Nexus Air members, who have added to their security clearance information a 
recording of their ‗iris scan‘, to have streamlined access at the airport border by using 
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automated kiosks with touch screens to answer questions similar to those an inspection 
officer would ask. A camera on the kiosk takes a photo of the member‘s iris to verify 
their identity. This iris recognition process ensures that only pre-approved, low-risk 
travelers receive faster border processing (Retrieved February 23, 2008 from 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/Dec/nexus.xml). Another American 
example is in Virginia Beach, where facial-recognition devices are used in its permanent 
boardwalk video surveillance system (Guterl and Underhill, 2004). New York has 
reportedly contemplated installing numerous biometric recognition devices in Times 
Square (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 25, 2002). Perhaps most famously, security for the 
2001 Superbowl included hundreds of facial recognition cameras (Woodward, 2003).  
Ongoing technological advancements coupled with increasing fears of terrorism and 
crimes have increased the pressure to boost levels of surveillance and ensure the 
monitoring of public spaces in Canada. It is generally recognized that as the suburbs 
continue to expand and become more urbanized, researchers and citizens are recognizing 
a decline in the overall sense of community and an increase in fear of crime (Wilson-
Doenges, 2000).  Increasingly, CCTV is being considered as part of the solution to 
respond to the fear of crime. CCTV systems have been increasingly considered for use in 
public sector management primarily for deterrence, public safety, detection enhancement, 
and decreasing police response times (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2003). According 
to Hemple (2001), ―in the contemporary context, the predominant uses of CCTV in 
public spaces are in the management of risks, traffic jams, fire, accidents, and crime 
prevention‖ (Deisman in Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2003: 4).  Cameras are now 
being considered or are actively in use in public transportation settings, airports, 
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intersections as ‗red light cameras‘, markets, shopping malls, universities, government 
buildings, and public streets.  
The use of cameras and photographic images for use in crime control originated 
when photography itself was first invented. The first patented photographic procedure 
date back to Paris in 1839 and ―by the 1840‘s, its potential for identifying and 
documenting the criminal classes had already been recognized‖ (Sekula, 1992: 334). In 
England and France, by the mid 1850‘s, the process of taking photographs of prisoners to 
―prevent escapes and to document recidivism was being officially encouraged‖ (Rouille, 
1987: 51). The history of television use in crime control is similar. Television pictures 
were first broadcasted in 1926, and then were introduced for public use with an official 
launch by the BBC in 1936.  Williams (2003) stated, that within a decade, in 1947, a 
police superintendent requested use of BBC‘s footage of the Royal wedding to assist in 
management decisions and deployment of officers; a request that was denied because of 
expense (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004).  In 1956, police in Durham, England began 
to use CCTV to assist in the operation of traffic lights. By 1960, the Metropolitan police 
mounted two pan-tilt and zoom cameras to monitor crowds in Trafalgar Square during a 
State Visit to Parliament. This installation was considered temporary, yet later that same 
year, was reinstalled to monitor party goers on Guy Fawkes Night. Norris et al. (2004) 
noted that, by 1969, 14 different police forces were using CCTV with a total of 67 
cameras nationally across Britain. As well, given that the video recorder was increasingly 
available commercially during the 1960‘s, the early growth of CCTV for use in retail 
settings had begun, evolving over the next two decades to become a routine part of 
security for the retail sector as the predominant locations for everyday usage. Limited 
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diffusion into other sectors occurred, with the exception of the London Underground 
transit system which installed cameras in 1975 to prevent assaults to staff and prevent 
robberies. That same year, 145 cameras were used to monitor traffic flow in Central 
London.  McCahill and Norris (2002) stated that the use of cameras by police in the 
1970‘s and early 1980‘s was, for the most part, used to focus on marginal groups, such as 
football hooligans and political demonstrators (Norris et al., 2004).   
In 1985, Bournemouth, a city in the UK, became the first to implement a permanent 
public CCTV camera as it was hosting the annual Conservative Party Convention and an 
attempt by the IRA to assassinate the Prime Minister and her Cabinet had occurred at the 
Convention the previous year (McCahill and Norris, 2002). CCTV began to gradually 
spread to other towns and cities throughout the UK and, by the end of the 1990‘s, over 
500 monitoring systems were in place with a broader dissemination occurring in the retail 
and transport sectors. ―By 1991, in the UK, there were no more than ten cities with open 
street systems in operation. What characterized these systems was that they were small 
scale, locally funded, and set up as the result of entrepreneurship, often on the part of a 
local police officer‖ (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004: 111).  Norris et al. (2004) speculated 
that the diffusion of CCTV may have continued in this gradual manner had it not been for 
the tragic and highly publicized ―fuzzy CCTV images of toddler Jamie Bulgar being led 
away from a Merseyside shopping mall by his two ten-year old killers‖, which served to 
position CCTV in the public spotlight. (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004: 111).   And, while 
it was recognized that CCTV had not prevented the murder, it did serve to dramatize the 
event to the public, through the nightly recurrence of the story and its images on the 
national news, that the killers would be caught (Smith, 1994).  This heightened public 
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anxiety, combined with increased recorded and publicized crime by the media, led to an 
announcement by Home Secretary, Michael Howard, of the ‗City Challenge 
Competition‘ which dedicated two million pounds of central government funding for 
open street CCTV. A huge response occurred resulting in an increase to five million 
pounds, as well as three more ‗City Challenges‘ taking place between 1995 and 1998.  
Government funding, as well as the promotion of partnerships with the private sector 
through ‗matching funds‘, resulted in nearly one billion pounds being funnelled into 
CCTV systems at a rapid pace.  And, despite the change in elected parties in 1997, the 
funding continued. On the basis of figures available, ―during the decade 1994-2004 we 
would estimate that around four to five billion pounds was spent on the installation of 
CCTV and maintenance of CCTV systems in the UK, and this excludes the monitoring 
costs associated with these systems‖ (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004: 112).  It is 
impossible to translate this into an exact number of cameras, yet, in 1999, Norris and 
Armstrong estimated that: 
In an urban environment, on a busy day, a person may have their image captured by 
over 300 cameras on thirty separate CCTV systems. More recently, Norris and 
McCahill ‗guestimated‘ on the basis of a survey in one London borough that there 
may be as many as 4.2 million cameras in the UK or 1 for every 14 of the 
population (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004: 111).  
 
According to Norris (2003), ―recent estimates indicate that 800 publicly funded 
systems are operational, supporting more than 40,000 public cameras across the UK‖ 
(Hier et al., 2007: 727). CCTV is now commonplace in the UK and has continued to 
expand despite mixed research findings. McCahill and Norris (2003) estimated that over 
four million public and privately owned cameras exist in the UK.  According to Tony 
McNulty, Minister of State for Security, Counter Terrorism, and Police and Ministerial 
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Adviser on Parliamentary Affairs, in the Home Office‘s report entitled, ―National CCTV 
Strategy‖:  
The United Kingdom is generally recognised as a leading user of Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) for community safety and crime investigation purposes. We 
regularly see examples of where it has been used to make our streets safer, reduce 
the fear of crime, and detect serious offences. The use of CCTV in the support of 
terrorist investigations in the UK has led to considerable worldwide interest, with 
many countries now following us in developing CCTV infrastructures (Home 
Office  National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 4). 
 
In other parts of Europe, the use of CCTV in public open street surveillance is less 
commonplace.  According to the Urbaneye report completed in 2004, while there were 
40,000 open street cameras in the UK designed to monitor public space, less than 1,000 
existed in the other European countries included in the study.  In Oslo and Norway, there 
was one system; there were none in Copenhagen and Vienna; Budapest had over 14; and 
Berlin had 15 (Urbaneye, 2004). The Urbaneye data suggested that the diffusion of 
CCTV across Europe was limited; however, in some other European cities which were 
not included in the study, a substantial increase in the number of CCTV systems for use 
in open street surveillance existed. For example, in France, particularly since the 
relaxation of laws governing public street surveillance in 1995, a rapid increase of CCTV 
systems took place. ―Between 1997 and 1999, more than 200 French cities received the 
approval for the installation of CCTV in high risk locations and 259 for the protection of 
public buildings such as town halls, public libraries, schools and museums‖ (Hempel and 
Topfer, 2002: 10).  The Netherlands also installed their first cameras for public space 
surveillance in 1997 and within six years, of the country‘s 550 municipalities, over 80 
were using CCTV in public spaces. In the Republic of Ireland, Dublin installed its first 
system in the mid 1990‘s with further expansion occurring in 1997. Since then, further 
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expansion of open street systems throughout the country, to over 21 different areas, has 
taken place. In Italy, 22 of the 33 sports facilities with over 20,000 spectator capacity 
were equipped with camera surveillance and 50 of Italy‘s cities have installed systems in 
areas which have been categorized as most sensitive (Norris et al., 2004). 
In the United States (US), public video surveillance systems were first 
experimented with by cities which mounted cameras over public streets in the 1960s  
(Burrows, 1997). Even though these early systems have been removed, police have 
continued to make use of selective public video cameras as a means of gathering 
evidence about a specific individual or place as an integral part of their investigations 
(Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007). In the first 
national survey of CCTV systems conducted in 1997, it was determined that only 13 
police departments in the US were using CCTV video surveillance and these systems 
were used predominantly for pedestrian and traffic monitoring in downtown and 
residential districts. By 2001, the number of American cities with systems to monitor 
public spaces expanded to 25.  The systems at that time ranged from the less complex 
system set up in the San Diego museum and mall areas of Balboa Park, to much larger 
systems, such as those in Washington DC which included hundreds of cameras for 
monitoring mass transit, shopping areas, schools, monuments, streets, and 
neighborhoods. More notably, the images captured by law enforcement of the hijackers 
involved with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 served to demonstrate the importance 
and effectiveness of video technology (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and 
Security Committee, 2007). Although there is limited data on the extent of expansion of 
CCTV since 9/11, Nieto et al., (2002) argued that expansion and rapid diffusion of both 
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biometric technologies and CCTV surveillance would occur as a result of technological 
advances, heightened security concerns, and declining costs. It is projected that most 
American cities would likely follow the lead of Chicago which, ―in September of 2004, 
announced plans to install more than 2,000 surveillance cameras in public places‖ (Norris 
et al., 2004: 114-115). Norris et al., (2004) noted that, compared to the UK, the US had 
moved slowly with CCTV expansion and the growth that had occurred was 
predominantly in the private sector. In Hallberg‘s 1996 national survey of US businesses, 
it was found that 75% of all businesses used CCTV (Norris et al., 2004). However, police 
often utilized footage gathered from privately managed cameras, such as those at 
convenience stores, ATM‘s, and in airports (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty 
and Security Committee, 2007). 
Sutton and Wilson (2003) reviewed CCTV in Australia and reported that an 
increase from 13 systems in 1996 to 33 in 2002 took place. Australian systems have been 
most often utilized in public transport systems with over 5,500 systems in the state of 
New South Wales which operated at over 300 stations, over 1,900 buses, and in 75% of 
taxis (Norris et al., 2004). In a report conducted by Van Rensburg in 2001, it was 
reported that in Africa, CCTV systems were used in almost all commercial venues, such 
as hotels, casinos, banks, retail stores, airports, financial institutions (excluding ATM‘s), 
mines, garages, hospitals, and shopping centres (Norris et al., 204:115). In 2004, 
following the high profile murder of a passenger, the South African Railway Commuter 
Corporation announced a 200 million Rand plan to equip each of its 4,500 train carriages 
with four CCTV cameras. By 2000, Cape Town had already installed 72 open street 
cameras and had outlined a ten year plan for an expansion to extend cameras citywide 
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(Damon, 2003; Smith, 2000). The largest surveillance system in Africa is in 
Johannesburg which established a 15 camera system in the year 2000 with joint funding 
from the City Council and the Provincial Government. The system had expanded to 90 
cameras over the next year, and was predicted to be up to 360 cameras by the year 2003 
(Wilson and Sutton, 2003).  
In China, the Golden Shield Project was a national surveillance plan to develop a 
comprehensive and advanced CCTV infrastructure. The Straits Time newspaper dated 
August 14, 2004, reported that, by the year 2010, Shanghai would have more that 
200,000 CCTV cameras installed throughout the city to deter crime and maintain social 
order (Straits Times, 2004). In 2002, the cameras in Tokyo were located in either the 
adult entertainment district, which had 50 cameras, or in the governmental district which 
had a total of 24 cameras. Matsubara (2004) predicted that an increase in the number of 
systems would occur as there had been a marked increase in recorded crime (Norris et al., 
2004). 
Middle Eastern countries, India, Russia, and Eastern Europe have all introduced and 
expanded CCTV video surveillance for varying reasons over recent years.  In India, it 
was noted that systems were not used for the purpose of watching over its cities, but were 
installed with the intent of monitoring the behavior of junior police officers. In Israel, 
systems were focused at key strategic locations which had been identified as being 
vulnerable to car and suicide bombings. According to Norris and Armstrong (1999), the 
use of covert cameras was well documented in the former communist bloc countries, yet 
little documentation has developed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In October of 2004, 
the Security Installer magazine predicted electronic security growth prospects would 
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occur in central and Eastern Europe by the year 2010. In a Czech Police force study, it 
was reported that, in Prague, 200 cameras were reported to be installed in the city‘s 
central streets which later would be linked to an automatic facial recognition system 
(Norris et al., 2004).   
According to the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner‘s report (2006), the 
use of video surveillance in public spaces has increased substantially over the past decade 
in Canada. Technological advancements, reductions in prices, and increased availability 
of these systems has led to rapid increases in the number of systems being implemented 
by public authorities, private sector parties, and property owners (Government of Canada, 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner Guidelines, March 2006). The police and public 
security agencies use the systems to monitor public spaces and parks; some cities have 
placed video surveillance systems for use during specific festival periods. Moreover, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have implemented surveillance technology in 
high security areas, such as Parliament Hill, and cameras are in active use at Canada-US 
border crossings. In terms of future projections of CCTV usage, the Vancouver Sun 
newspaper reported in August 2007 that the cost and extent of security for the Olympic 
Games to be held in Vancouver in 2010 would far exceed the original estimates and will 
involve advances in surveillance, including CCTV (Vancouver Sun newspaper, August 
4
th
, 2007). More recently, the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC) reported that the 
system of cameras expected to be installed for 2010 may not be removed after the 
Olympics, a statement which created an influx of concerns and comment submissions 
from civil libertarians concerned about privacy, as well as responses from supporters who 
felt that the cameras would make Vancouver a safer city (Canadian Broadcast 
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Corporation, on-line report May 12, 2008). And, ―as 2010 approaches, British 
Columbians can expect to see tighter security around transportation infrastructure, 
including ferries‖ (Vancouver Sun newspaper, August 4th 2007: A5). The Vancouver 
Province newspaper reported on May 16, 2007, that Transport Canada‘s Transit Secure 
Initiative earmarked $115 million for a program to make Canada‘s six major transit 
systems more secure. At the time of the writing of the article, Greater Vancouver‘s 
Translink system had received $9.8 million of the dedicated federal funding for its CCTV 
and security enhancements.  As well, Canadians are likely to expect to see an increase in 
the number of ‗red light cameras‘ at intersections to monitor, deter, and apprehend traffic 
signal light offenders (The Surrey NOW, August 21, 2007). At the time this newspaper 
article was written, Surrey had 13 operating red light cameras at intersections. When 
asked if the cameras worked to decrease the number of crashes, three of the key project 
partners stated yes. The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC), the police 
services department of the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, who provide 
joint funding of the project, as well as RCMP Cpl. Lloyd Holtzmann of the Intersection 
Camera Unit were all in agreement that the cameras were an effective tool for use in 
public safety. "We've seen a 14% reduction in crashes across the province at intersections 
where there are cameras. It's an effective tool to help with overall collision reduction" 
stated Kate Best of ICBC (Surrey NOW newspaper, August 21, 2008).  It was further 
stated that there were 120 camera locations throughout the Province of British Columbia 
which were rotated with operational cameras, making it impossible to tell if the camera is 
set up to take photos or not. Essentially, at any given time at these camera locations, any 
vehicle passing through the intersection on a yellow or red light will activate the 
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equipment. According to the number of violations recorded in Surrey, a drop from 1,500 
in 2002 to 1,000 in 2006 occurred and Surrey Mayor, Diane Watts expressed a desire to 
install more operational lights (Surrey NOW newspaper, August 21, 2008). 
As demonstrated in this review of the history of CCTV, as well as the overview of 
the technological advancements and usages of various systems worldwide, the trend 
towards an increasing number of cameras being used for the purposes of public safety is 
taking place. As well, the discussion of CCTV expansion worldwide in the private sector 
has led experts, such as Norris (2004), to take note of a diffusion of systems into the 
public realm. With increasing urbanization and the resultant trend towards anonymity, 
combined with increased mobility, high profile attacks of terrorism, and an overall 
societal focus on crime and crime control, CCTV systems will continue to develop, 
evolve, and expand in number (Norris et al., 2004).  The next chapter will examine the 
issues surrounding CCTV‘s effectiveness.  As will be demonstrated, research on the 
effectiveness of CCTV is often contradictory. In addition to reviewing the research, one 
of the objectives of this paper is to outline why studies of CCTV to date have produced 
varying results and what methods of evaluation are most effective.  
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Chapter Two:  CCTV’s Effect on Crime and Fear of Crime 
According to Armitage (2002), the idea that CCTV can play a part in reducing 
crime is based on a number of key assumptions. The first assumption is about the concept 
of deterrence.  Essentially, the first assumption is that the potential offender becomes 
aware of the existence of CCTV surveillance and assesses whether the risks associated 
with offending at this particular location outweigh the benefits. The individual then 
makes a choice to not offend or to offend somewhere else (Armitage, 2002).  The second 
assumption is based on the premise of efficient deployment, which refers to the ability of 
the individuals who are monitoring the systems to determine whether or not police 
assistance is required, results in a more effective use of police resources. Thirdly, an 
assumption based on the concept of self discipline occurs on two levels: the first level 
occurs within the potential victim who is reminded of the possibility of crime occurring 
and chooses to alter their behaviour accordingly, while the second level the self discipline 
occurs within potential offender.  In the case of the offender, ―through a process similar 
to that described by Foucault in his discussion of Bentham‘s Panopticon, the threat of 
potential surveillance (whether the cameras are actually being monitored may be 
irrelevant) acts to produce a self discipline in which individuals police their own 
behaviour‖ (Armitage, 2002: 2).  In the Panopticon (Foucault, 1991) prison cells were 
arranged around a central watchtower where a guard could constantly watch over 
inmates.  The inmates were never quite sure whether they were being watched or not 
which resulted in them policing their own behaviour.  In this way, the effect of CCTV 
cameras may lead to self discipline through the fear of surveillance, even if it is only 
imagined (Armitage, 2002). The fourth assumption is the presence of a capable guardian. 
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According to Routine Activities theory, in order for a crime to be committed, three 
factors must be present: a motivated offender; a suitable target; and the absence of a 
capable guardian. Any act that prevents the existence of all three of these factors taking 
place at the same time and in the same place reduces the likelihood of a crime occurring 
(Armitage, 2002).  The assumption here is that CCTV serves to fill the role of a capable 
guardian (someone watching) resulting in reductions in crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979). 
The fifth and final assumption is detection. This premise is based on the idea that crimes 
captured on video surveillance are detected and lead to the arrest and punishment of the 
offender (Armitage, 2002). CCTV has been used in several high profile cases 
demonstrating its contributions in the detection of criminal behaviour, identification of 
suspects, and arrest of the offender (Armitage, 2002).  
A substantial amount of research affirmed CCTV‘s effectiveness in reducing 
crime, especially specific types of property crime.   
Research into the effectiveness of CCTV suggests that it is most effective in 
reducing property crime. This goes some way to supporting the ‗rational choice 
theory‘ which suggests that offenders seek to maximize the benefits of offending 
and in doing so make rational choices or decisions based upon the information or 
cues available to them at the time of the offending.  CCTV appears to deter the 
criminal in offences such as vehicle crime or burglary, perhaps on the basis that 
they perceive the risk of apprehension to outweigh the benefits (Armitage, 2002: 
3).  
 
Tilley (1997) concluded that car parks with CCTV installations had lower rates of car 
crime when comparing the same area before the installation took place, as well as in 
comparison to a control group, with the effects being stronger for theft from versus theft 
of vehicles. Tilley studied car crime in the late 1980‘s to early 1990‘s within the six Safer 
Cities schemes of Hartlepool, Hull, Bradford, Lewisham, Coventry, and Wolverhampton 
which examined a variety of different car park settings.  The overall conclusion was that 
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the data provided strong evidence that schemes which implemented CCTV had generally 
led to reductions in various categories of car crime with an overall understanding that it 
worked best when implemented alongside other crime prevention measures, such as 
lighting, fencing, and painting (Tilley, 1997). However, in a systematic review of the 
crime prevention effects of CCTV, Welsh and Farrington (2002) dismissed Tilley‘s 
studies based on poor evaluation criteria, namely for not having comparable control sites. 
Short and Ditton (1996), as well as Armitage (1999), found CCTV had an effect on 
reducing vehicle crime, yet, Welsh and Farrington also critiqued these studies for their 
lack of control sites or crime data within the control sites. According to Armitage (2002), 
Skinns (1998) found a reduction in vehicle crime following the installation of CCTV 
within the city centre of Doncaster.  Armitage (2002) also noted that, in an analysis of 
three town centres in the UK, Brown (1995) found overall property crime was reduced 
within the areas where CCTV was implemented, yet, once again, Welsh and Farrington 
do not include this study in their systematic review in 2002 because no crime data for the 
experimental or control areas were provided.  
 
Poyner (1992) concluded that significant decreases in thefts from vehicles 
occurred as a result of CCTV installation. In this study, Poyner (1992) examined car 
parks at the University of Surrey in Guildford in the UK and noted that a significant 
decrease in thefts from cars; from 92 incidents to 31 over the one year time span in car 
parks which implemented CCTV (1985 to 1986), and a reduction of 15 to 12 incidents of 
theft of vehicles.  Squires (1998), in his study of Ilford Town Centre, concluded that 
reductions occurred in criminal damage offences (vandalism). In his study, Squires 
interviewed a total of 1,532 people in two surveys, 12 months apart before and after the 
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installation of CCTV.  His goal was to determine public support for CCTV and overall 
feelings of safety. His findings were that 92.6% of the people were in favour of CCTV 
before its installation and 95.2% were in favour afterwards. Additionally, he studied 
police crime data recorded from June 1996 to December of 1997. Armitage et al. (1999), 
in a study of Burnley Town Centre, found reductions occurred as a result of CCTV 
installation in all crime categories, including car crime, burglary, vandalism, fraud, and 
handling of stolen goods.  
In an analysis of the effect of CCTV on burglary, Chatterton and Frenz (1994) 
found CCTV was effective at reducing burglary in a sheltered housing setting and cited a 
79% decrease in burglary completions and attempts for the 5-10 month period studied. 
However, Welsh and Farrington (2002) in their critique of various research studies of 
CCTV noted that no control group was included in the Chatterton and Frenz study. Still, 
Armitage et al. (1999) reached a similar conclusion stating that burglary decreased with 
CCTV implementation. Decreases in vandalism were also found by Armitage et al. 
(1999) and Squires (1998). Poyner (1992) found that CCTV‘s effect on vandalism rates 
was unclear in general, but had a positive effect in the specific setting of buses.  Short 
and Ditton (1996) found reductions in shoplifting, vehicle crime, fraud, burglary, and 
arson as a result of the introduction of CCTV cameras in Airdre. In Squires‘ (1998) study 
of Doncaster city centre, vehicle crime decreased (Armitage, 2002). Drug offenses 
appeared to experience significant reductions (Armitage et al., 1999). 
There is also research which contradicted CCTV‘s effectiveness at reducing 
property crime.  Brown (1995) found no reductions in burglary rates following the 
installation of CCTV and measured an increase in theft from vehicles and vandalism.  
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Likewise, in his study of Ilford Town Centre, Squires (1998) found no reductions in 
shoplifting and burglary as a result of the installation of CCTV.  Armitage (2002) stated 
that, in a study of Doncaster city centre, Squires (1998) also found that burglary, 
vandalism, nor shoplifting decreased as a result of CCTV. Grandmassion (1997) found no 
overall change specific to vandalism. Squires (1998) did not find that the implementation 
of CCTV reduced drug offences, and Skinns (1998) was unable to conclude that CCTV 
installation reduced personal crime (Armitage, 2002; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
2003). 
Generally speaking, property crimes were reduced with CCTV more than other 
types of crimes, especially theft from vehicles and theft of vehicles (Brown 1995;  Skinns 
1998;  Tilley 1993). In Welsh and Farrington‘s 2002 comprehensive review of 22 studies 
to determine the effect of CCTV on crime rates, the authors concluded that 11 of the 
studies showed CCTV produced a desirable effect on crime, five showed an undesirable 
effect on crime, and no clear evidence of effect for the remaining five.  
Research on CCTV‘s effectiveness in reducing personal crimes has also produced 
some positive results. Armitage (1999) found significant reductions in violence in 
Burnley town centre after CCTV was installed. Webb and Laycock (1992) found that, as 
a result of CCTV installation, incidents of robbery decreased in London Underground 
stations (Deisman, 2003). The Ilford study (Squires, 1998) also found decreased robbery 
and theft from person offences. Some research, however, also suggested that CCTV‘s 
effectiveness at reducing crimes against or involving people contradicted the positive 
results of the above studies. ―In crimes involving alcohol (such as public disorder) where 
‗rationality‘ is often lost, the deterrent or ‗risk‘ effect of CCTV is weakened‖ (Armitage, 
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2002: 3). In his research on CCTV‘s effectiveness, Skinns (1998) did not find significant 
reductions on the personal offence of assault.  
The question of CCTV‘s efficacy in reducing crime is complicated by 
displacement. The concept of displacement suggests that the introduction of measures to 
prevent crime, such as CCTV, in a specific area will reduce crime opportunities resulting 
in offenders either not committing an offence (deterrence) or selecting a more desirable 
target elsewhere (displacement). In other words, the crime may not actually be reduced, 
but shifted to another location.  
The principal theoretical criticism levelled against opportunity-reducing forms of 
crime prevention, such as situational prevention, is that thwarted offenders will turn 
their attention to some other target or location, commit their crimes at another time, 
change their methods, or even turn to some other form of crime (Clarke and 
Weisburd, 2008: 165).  
In support of the displacement position, Brown (1995) found that personal crimes, 
including robbery and theft, increased in outlying areas not covered by CCTV.  A similar 
result was also found by Skinns (1998). In contrast to the effect of displacement, others 
studies have suggested that outlying areas may also benefit from the introduction of 
crime prevention measures through what is known as a ‗diffusion of benefits‘. This 
concept can be described as ―the spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention 
beyond the places which are directly targeted, the individuals who are the subject of 
control, the crimes which are the focus of intervention, or the time periods in which the 
intervention is brought‖ (Clarke and Weisburd, 2008: 169). Clarke and Weisburd (2008) 
outlined two types of diffusion. The first type is known as ‗deterrence‘ and the second as 
‗discouragement‘.   
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The clearest example to date of this form of diffusion of benefits (deterrence) is 
provided by Poyner's (1988) evaluation of the use of CCTV to combat vandalism 
and graffiti on a fleet of 80 double-deck buses in the North of England. Even 
though live cameras were installed on only two of the buses and dummy cameras 
on another three, vandalism and graffiti declined sharply for the whole fleet. This 
diffusion seems to have been assisted by some well-publicized apprehensions of 
juvenile vandals resulting from use of the CCTV and by a deliberate effort to 
demonstrate the operation of the CCTV by taking one of the "video buses" around 
the schools in the area (Poyner, 1988, as cited by Clarke and Weisburd, 2008: 
171). 
 
Two other examples of diffusion were observed in a study conducted in a 
university parking lot in England and in an electronics warehouse in New Jersey. In the 
first example, Poyner (1991) found equal reductions in auto thefts in Surrey, England for 
lots not covered by CCTV and in the university parking lots where the CCTV was 
installed.  Poyner summarized his findings as "the CCTV system enabled the security 
guards to make three arrests immediately after the system became operational and three 
further arrests and two specific loudspeaker warnings in the following three months" 
(Poyner, 1991, as cited by Clarke and Weisburd, 2008: 172). In the second example, 
Masuda (1992) found that the action of repeatedly counting of VCR‘s and camcorders 
kept in a storage area resulted in reductions in theft of the items as well as reductions in 
theft of other valuable items, such as portable CD players and radar detectors which were 
not being counted. In this case, warehouse staff was aware of the daily counting 
procedure, but not which items were being counted (Clarke and Weisburd, 2008). 
‗Situational deterrence‘ (Cusson, 1993), which underlies the first kind of 
diffusion, achieves its effect by increasing the fear of arrest. However, risk of 
apprehension (and the subsequent punishment) is only one of the factors that 
offenders weigh when deciding to commit crime. According to the rational choice 
perspective, they also consider effort and reward. When the former has become 
incommensurate with the latter, offenders may be discouraged from crime even if 
the risks of detection have not increased. The spread of such discouragement 
beyond the crimes targeted constitutes the second form of diffusion (Clarke and 
Weisburd, 2008: 172). 
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This second form of diffusion, known as ‗discouragement,‘ was demonstrated in a 
study by Poyner and Webb (1987), which, though not specifically related to CCTV, 
served to effectively demonstrate the concept. Poyner and Webb (1987) demonstrated 
that improved lighting and reduced congestion in the most vulnerable markets in 
Birmingham, England resulted in reduced thefts at all city centre markets. "What seems 
to have happened is that by improving the worst areas of risk, the whole market area has 
benefited. The general attractiveness of this area for thieves has been reduced" (Poyner 
and Webb, 1987, as cited by Clarke and Weisburd, 2008: 173). This explanation has also 
been described as the ‗multiplier effect‘ (Chaiken et al., 1974).  In their research, which 
attempted to explain sudden increases followed by decreases in subway and bus robberies 
in New York in the 1970‘s,  fluctuations occurred as a result of a few offenders 
demonstrating that a particular type of crime or time of day proved to be a profitable 
opportunity for crime. This success led others to try it which resulted in a rapid increase 
of incidents. Next, an anti-crime measure was implemented which served to demonstrate 
that the chances of success had changed, at least temporarily, resulting in ―the multiplier 
effect operating in the opposite direction, causing a decrease that may even be greater 
than that merited by the effectiveness of the measure‖ (Chaiken et al., 1974, as cited by 
Clarke and Weisburd, 2008: 173). In essence, the idea of discouragement is based on the 
notion that offenders assess the level of risk and make rational choices based on the 
likelihood of getting caught. If the likelihood of getting caught is high, they are 
discouraged from offending.  The limitations of this perspective, however, are that 
offenders who do not think rationally about their potential capture, due to factors such as 
drug addiction or hopelessness, will not likely be deterred.  
 26 
Cultural and social attitudes toward CCTV have also been recognized as having 
an impact on CCTV‘s perceived effect on crime. In Squires‘ 2002 Ilford Town Centre 
study, it was found that women were more in favour of CCTV cameras than men, and 
women also tended to experience more fear of crime. ―Public attitudes toward CCTV 
have a great impact on the degree to which such systems are accepted and effective‖ 
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2003: 9-10). Given that different groups respond 
differently in their acceptance as well as expectations of CCTV, it is important to assess 
these attitudes and expectations in advance, as well as to be aware of the general trends. 
In an assessment of the effects of CCTV on crime, Deisman (2003) recommended three 
caveats for consideration when reviewing CCTV‘s effect on crime. First, the CCTV 
system must be viewed as one part of a larger crime control strategy making it extremely 
difficult to conclude whether any observed changes in crime rates which occurred after 
its implementation were ―casually connected to, or even in any way a consequence of, 
CCTV coverage‖ (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2003: 11-12). Secondly, changes in 
crime rates are not necessarily considered a reliable measure of changes in actual 
incidents. Thirdly, the methodological difficulties associated with comparing individual 
CCTV systems are a result of not only variations in the set ups and configurations of the 
systems, but also in their management and monitoring procedures (Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, 2003). 
More effective measurements of CCTV‘s effect on crime will provide invaluable 
information in deciding whether or not to implement CCTV. Deisman (2003) stated that 
most researchers agreed that CCTV‘s impact on crime was not the same across crime 
categories. This suggested that the optimal use of CCTV required ongoing evaluations of 
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its efficacy not only in areas where it is implemented, but also in outlying areas and with 
the use of comparable control groups. Indeed, the combination of positive and negative 
results in attempting to reduce crime suggests that there is an advantage to monitoring the 
outlaying areas of CCTV locations.  
A common justification for the implementation of CCTV in public settings has 
been based on the premise that these surveillance systems will have a positive effect on 
reducing fear of crime. For this reason, a general overview of fear of crime as well as 
CCTV‘s impact on it is required.  
Perception of safety, usually referred to as fear of crime, has been on the increase, 
while actual crime (according to crime rates) appears to be declining. ―Fear of crime has 
been noted to be more widespread than actual crime, and these two factors have been 
shown to have little correlation‖ (Wilson-Doenges, 2000: 600). The concern is also that 
fear of crime can have as many real consequences as actual crime, in that it can 
negatively affect quality of life over time, increase individuals likelihood of isolating 
themselves from social activities, and increase their distrust levels.  The problem is 
compounded by the fact that fear of crime can disrupt an individual‘s life as much as 
actual crime can.  For example, fear of crime can exacerbate an individual‘s anxieties and 
increase social isolation to a crippling degree (Wilson-Doenges, 2000). 
Similarly, McIntyre (1967) researched the significance of fear of crime, finding 
reductions in social interaction as well as the restriction of activities for those 
surveyed. ―They forego opportunities for pleasure or cultural enrichment, and they 
become less sociable and more suspicious. The level of interaction and mutual trust 
in society is reduced; public places become less safe than they otherwise might be‖ 
(McIntyre, 1967, as cited in Hartnagel, 1979: 177). 
The National Crime Surveys (NCS) of the 1970‘s focused primarily on 
victimization and social control perspectives. However, Garofalo and Laub (1978) 
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focused more on the relationships between the way residents perceived or were affected 
by quality of life factors in their neighbourhood, such as environment, parking and traffic, 
noise levels, problems with neighbours, availability of shopping, and schools contributed 
to their fear of crime. ―Consequently, residents who are less satisfied with their 
neighbourhood‘s quality of life will express a greater fear of crime that those who are 
more satisfied‖ (Hale, 1979: 13).  
Measurement of fear of crime has received considerable debate. Some researchers 
have defined the construct as it relates to feelings of fear specifically, while others have 
suggested it not only includes feelings, but also cognitive judgments, such as increased 
likelihood of victimization, as well as behavioral modifications, such as not walking 
alone at night (McCrea et al., 2005: 8).  
During the 1930‘s, interest emerged for the development of social indicators or 
―socially significant statistically descriptive data about the national well-being of 
American society, gathered in time series so as to show social trends‖ (Lee, 2001: 473). 
By the 1960‘s, a huge increase in the scope and types of surveys and studies was 
occurring. The social movements of the 1960‘s began to influence political will and an 
increase in interest for information about the betterment of society. At the same time, 
improvement in the gathering of crime data and statistics, especially in terms of victims, 
began to take shape. Several organizations in the USA in the late 1960‘s began to 
interview individuals about their personal experiences, feelings, and types of 
victimization with the goal of obtaining more accurate crime data (Gordon and Riger, 
1989 as cited by Hale, 1996 ). ―Ironically, if the will to become a more ‗knowable‘ 
society developed in part from the civil rights movements of the 1960‘s, so, too, the new 
 29 
politics of ―law and order‖ and an increase in public desire for tougher laws, stronger 
policing efforts as well as the punishment of criminals was occurring‖ (Lee, 2001: 476).   
Since 1970...the motif of ‗fear of crime‘ has taken on a new discursive and 
bureaucratic importance, to the extent that it is now regarded as a problem in and 
of itself.... The dynamics of contemporary crime-control policies are increasingly 
oriented towards reducing fear of crime rather than actual crime and they rely to 
an increasing extent on populist discourses of potential victims, symbolic politics, 
and public/community safety initiatives in the production of social order and 
social control (Hier et al., 2006 as cited in Hier et al., 2007: 745). 
From a sociological and psychological research standpoint, fear of crime has been found 
to influence emotive, cognitive, and behavioural changes specific to many individuals‘ 
perception of safety.  Other sociological studies have also revealed class issues to be 
causally implicated in the fear of crime: 
At the societal level, the fear of crime burden may be unfairly placed on 
those already socially and economically disadvantaged, and without 
sufficient resources to protect themselves and their possessions or to move 
from high crime areas (McCrea, Shyy, Western, & Stimson, 2005: 8). 
 
Francisco Klauser (2007) critically assessed the adequacy and limitations of CCTV as a 
tool to revitalize urban areas suffering from concentrated social disadvantage. Klauser 
(2007) demonstrated CCTV to be an ineffective tool to revitalize public places 
characterized by fear because its use was forgotten very quickly, especially in areas of 
high social dysfunction and crime. 
Based on the general understanding of CCTV as a mediated form of social 
control, which stands in stark contrast to traditional face-to-face encounters in 
public space, (Klauser) argues that CCTV both spatially and mentally disconnects 
the watched (monitored individuals) from the watchers (operators) (Klauser, 
2007: 338). 
The premise for Klauser‘s argument was based on three major limitations of 
CCTV. First, he stated that the short-term results of reductions in crime rates were often 
 30 
not demonstrated with longer follow-up periods (Armitage, 2002; Welsh and Farrington, 
2002; Gill and Spriggs, 2005). Given this, Klauser suggested that people soon forgot that 
the cameras existed and began to resume their past behaviours. Second, a growing 
number of CCTV evaluations suggested that the efficiency of CCTV depended strongly 
on the type of crime being analyzed. For example, CCTV appeared to be most effective 
in car parks and at reducing vehicle crime (cost-benefit calculations or premeditated 
crime), with limited effects on vandalism or aggressive behaviour on public transport or 
within city centre settings (impulsive crime) (Brown, 1995; Welsh and Farrington, 2002; 
Gill and Spriggs, 2005). Finally, Klauser (2007) described the limitations specific to the 
functioning systems of CCTV as dependent on a variety of ―system-inherent factors, 
ranging from collaborations between operators to technical dimensions of the cameras...‖ 
(Klauser, 2007; 339). According to Akrich and Meadel (1999), CCTV must be 
considered a dynamic socio-technical construction which is constantly ‗in the making‘ 
(Klauser, 2007; 339).  
What exactly is the fear of crime?  Research suggests that the concept of fear of 
crime has a range of implications and is difficult to measure.  The Figgie Report on Fear 
of Crime (1980) reported that fear was not a one-dimensional concept, but had at least 
two distinct aspects affecting 70% of the population to some degree (Pollock and 
Rosenblat, 1984 as cited by Hale, 1996). The report made a useful distinction between 
formless fear (a vague uneasiness or foreboding about nonspecific threats in the 
community) and concrete fear (fear of specific violent acts). Formless fear reflected the 
quality-of-life concepts described by Garofalo and Laub (Hale, 1979).   
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The development of strategies to address each type of fear is implicitly tied to the 
technologies of governance.  Lee (2001) discussed Foucault‘s notion of governmentality, 
drawing a distinction between art and economy in the practice of power. ‗Art‘, as Lee 
explained, was that which oversaw the evolution of the political system, while ‗economy‘ 
was aimed at securing the greatest possible return from the investment of power 
(Foucault, 1991 as cited by Lee, 2001).  
The art of government is premised on the notion that the problem of population 
can be overcome by the development of a grid of governmental techniques and 
tactics through which subjects are not only governed, but take on an active role in 
their own governance. 
This sophisticated model of power and governance is instructive in understanding 
the emergence of ‗fear of crime‘ as a project for the disciplines and as an object of 
governance, and also the emergence of what I refer to as the fearing subject (Lee, 
2001: 470-471). 
The way that CCTV affects a community depends on people‘s assumptions and 
expectations of its effectiveness and impact. For this reason, it is important that research 
test the assumptions, measure the levels of support, and analyzes the perceptions and 
expectations in each of the specific communities where CCTV is being planned as 
opposed to making generalizations based on the broader population. For example, the 
British Crime Survey measured fear of crime and levels of reported victimization in the 
general population and used this information to make broad generalizations in a number 
of residential CCTV studies in the UK. (Home Office Research Study 292, 2005). As 
well, ‗feelings of safety‘ or ‗worry about crime‘ have been used by researchers in an 
effort to demonstrate support for CCTV (Hale 1996; Furstenburg, 1971). ―CCTV in the 
UK enjoys significant public support and year on year, fear of crime surveys state that the 
public feels safer due to the presence of CCTV‖ (National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 5). 
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Other research, such as that conducted by Simmons and Dodd (2003), demonstrated that 
fear of crime, perception of victimization, and the avoidance of particular areas are all 
influenced by socio-demographic factors. This supported the assumption that CCTV 
installation could influence the behaviour of specific segments of the public.  
Studies designed to measure support levels for CCTV have shown mixed results.  
Generally, at least two-thirds of the general population are supportive of CCTV, though 
this support varies widely across demographic lines. For example, females are more 
supportive than males (Dixon et al., forthcoming; Honess and Charman, 1992 as cited in 
Home Office Research Study 292; 2005). Older persons were more supportive that 
younger respondents (Bennett and Gelsthorpe, 1996).  However, no relationship has been 
found between ‗worry about being a victim of crime‘ and support of CCTV (Honess and 
Charman, 1992).  
Few studies have measured respondents‘ actual knowledge of how CCTV works, 
and the link between people‘s level of knowledge and support for CCTV. One 
study observed that, ‗public acceptance is based on limited, and partly inaccurate 
knowledge of the functions and the capabilities of CCTV systems in public places 
(Honess and Charman, 1992 as cited in Home Office Research Study 292, 2005: 
5).  
Moreover, there has been relatively little research on how precisely CCTV 
impacts on individuals. For example, there is some evidence that CCTV in shops 
causes staff to be less vigilant (Beck and Willis, 1995). Similarly, Dixon et al., 
(forthcoming) have suggested that CCTV could result in lower levels of social 
responsibility (Home Office Research Study 292, 2005: 5). 
 Since Honess and Charman‘s work (1992), there has not been significant change 
specific to the public‘s knowledge of CCTV and their support for it. Spriggs et al. (2005) 
found that the public remained relatively unaware of the capabilities of CCTV, yet their 
expectations of its effect on anti-social behaviour and crime were high. Spiggs et al. 
(2004) found that a clear majority of people believed that CCTV would reduce the 
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number of people hanging around, encourage people to report more incidents, reduce 
crime generally, and assist the police in their ability to respond more quickly to incidents. 
Overall, people felt that CCTV could offer some sort of remedy to community crime 
related problems.  
In research conducted for the Home Office in the UK (2005), researchers carried 
out evaluations of 89 CCTV sites in 14 different CCTV projects in a range of different 
settings across England utilizing a combination of methodologies focusing primarily on 
before and after public attitude surveys. The goals of the research were: to determine the 
level of effectiveness of CCTV for reducing crime, disorder, and fear of crime; to 
describe in more detail the impact of CCTV on fear of crime and individual behaviour 
choices; and to determine features of CCTV systems that determined effectiveness to 
facilitate the development of comparable research. The research was also designed to 
measure levels of public support for CCTV prior to its implementation, to provide 
benchmarks for comparison with the ‗after‘ survey results, to identify groups with 
specific vulnerabilities to crime and fear of crime, to test the hypothesis that CCTV in 
residential neighbourhoods would be more resisted on the premise that it invaded 
privacy, and to measure the expectations and characteristics specific to CCTV as they 
related to demographics or experience related indicators. Importantly, those areas where 
CCTV was implemented and subsequently studied were characterized by political and 
financial influences that might have affected public expectations and attitudes about the 
use of CCTV surveillance.  
Local politicians were reluctant to miss the opportunity to obtain money available 
for the installation of CCTV systems. It is clear that they were keen to be seen to 
be active in a particular area, in order to appease public opinion and address local 
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political pressures. The public level of support for CCTV and the belief in its 
efficacy are central to these driving forces (United Kingdom - Home Office, 
October, 2005: 2).  
 In a supplementary report conducted by the Home Office entitled ―Police 
Attitudes of and Use of CCTV‖ (Levesley and Martin, 2005), police respondents 
generally viewed CCTV as a very useful tool. It was used as the starting point for 
enquiries, as well as a cost-effective tool used to speed up investigations and encourage 
offenders to plead guilty.  As well, respondents felt that incidents were brought to their 
attention that may not have been otherwise.  However, police respondents also felt that 
CCTV increased demands on their workload. Police felt CCTV also served to increase 
the public‘s expectations.  Overall, however, the increased demand on workload and any 
negative feelings about the increased expectations were outweighed by the overall 
benefits of CCTV, such as improved conviction rates, less denial on the part of criminals 
due to being captured on video, and overall improvements to the evidence gathered 
(United Kingdom, Home Office Research on-line report, September, 2005).   
It is also important to note that the mixed findings on CCTV‘s effects on fear of 
crime can be partly attributed to the varied approaches taken in the many research 
projects. Differences in methodologies, locations, and stages of CCTV implementation 
were all factors that contributed to the mixed results. Studies have also often been 
contextually specific and have evaluated single systems in specific sets of circumstances 
without providing a full analysis of the other factors and their influences, making 
comparisons across all of the research very difficult (Spriggs et al., 2005).  Another key 
part to the understanding of outside influences and their effects on CCTV is the role that 
not only public expectations play, but also the existence of publicity, as well as the roles 
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which the media and politics play on the concept of fear of crime and CCTV‘s effect on 
fear of crime. Given this, the next chapter will focus on these factors and their influences 
on CCTV‘s emergence, acceptance, and success.
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Chapter Three: Publicity, Media, and Political Influences on 
CCTV 
          Sherman (1990) recognized the role of publicity in assisting to create an 
uncertainty of risk, which he referred to as a ―free bonus‖, because publicity‘s positive 
effect on deterrence often lasted beyond the period of intervention. Clarke and Weisburd 
(2008) expanded this notion to describe the broader role that publicity plays in advancing 
the benefits of an intervention beyond the immediate area of deployment. For example, as 
noted by Poyner (1988), live cameras were installed in two buses and the others were 
outfitted with dummy cameras, yet there was a significant reduction in vandalism and 
graffiti for the entire fleet of buses in the North of England. Poyner (1988) concluded that 
the substantial reductions in vandalism were the result of the considerable publicity of 
these new measures, the publication of the apprehension of a number of vandals, and the 
promotion of the video around the schools in the area. "The children have learned...that 
the cameras will enable misbehaving individuals to be picked out and that action will be 
taken. However, what they do not know is how extensive the risk is. They appear to 
believe that most buses have cameras, or at least they are uncertain about which buses 
have cameras" (Poyner, 1988:50). Clarke and Weisburd (2008) stated that, even if the 
reality was then promoted to demonstrate the fact that not all buses were outfitted with 
the cameras, and the risks were actually far less than initially anticipated, the crime 
prevention benefits may still have been significant similar to impaired driving 
interventions. 
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In an article published by Wade (1998), the downtown core of Baltimore began to 
explore the use of CCTV cameras in 1995 beginning with the Downtown Partnership of 
Baltimore project to supplement its Clean and Safe services program. This downtown 
district had already coordinated private security with police services and transit police to 
form a safety network; however, there was still a general feeling of fear and uneasiness in 
the downtown core. Public opinion was split during the initial conceptual phase with the 
business community favouring the use of cameras and some residents expressing privacy 
concerns. In the end, the support outweighed the opposition and the cameras were 
implemented with a very basic and inexpensive surveillance system being installed. 
According to an opinion survey and marketing campaign, the reaction to the system was 
said to be ―almost unanimous‖. The Public Safety Director, Frank Russo stated, ―It 
improves the way people feel about the community because there‘s the impression that 
someone is paying attention to their safety‖  (Wade, 1998: S 22). One of the benefits 
promoted by the project administrators was an improvement in the efficiency of the 
police department‘s response within the 16 block core because an officer would see 
where and what the problems were and, therefore, respond more appropriately. Still, 
CCTV systems were often implemented with little or no sound empirical research or 
evaluation processes in place and were often politically driven (Wade, 1998). Coleman 
and Sim (2000) illustrated the role of the business/elite in establishing and maintaining 
CCTV surveillance programmes. ―Not only does this address consumerism as a 
significant dimension of public surveillance schemes, but it also suggests that monitoring 
programmes are tied to relations of power, privilege, and social advantage‖ (Hier et al., 
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2007: 731). Yet, the promotion of CCTV often involves the participation of other non-
official groups, such as citizen action groups and the media.  As noted by Hier et al.,  
News outlets become important to public CCTV surveillance projects because of 
the privileged space these media occupy as cultural fields of struggle where 
contending interests with different levels of power and influence compete to 
define the nature of problems and issues, as well their preferred solutions. Many 
studies that address the establishment of public CCTV surveillance systems 
acknowledge the importance of news media as an arena where powerful groups 
attempt to secure hegemony (2007: 733).  
Hier et al. (2007) examined the role of the media and diverse interest groups in 
influencing CCTV project success or failure in three different Canadian cities. The first 
example is London, Ontario whose CCTV project was inspired by the success of the City 
of Sudbury‘s ―Eye in the Sky Monitoring Program‖. London‘s project was implemented 
with the goal of providing and maintaining a safe environment in the downtown core, as 
well as to deter crime and to improve the ability of the police to respond to anti-social 
behaviour and crime (Corporation of the City of London, 2001). At the time of their 
study,  Hier et al. noted that the City of London was responsible for operating the largest 
camera system in Canada with a total of 16 cameras, an initiative that was a citizen-led 
initiative following the tragic murder of a 20 year old man named Michael Goldie-Ryder. 
The murder mobilized the formation of a group called Friends Against Senseless Endings 
(FASE) and came to symbolize social disorder in the downtown core. FASE was led by 
the family and friends of the victim whose efforts were successful, within a two-year time 
frame, in developing enough publicity to raise the money and the levels of support to 
officially launch what has become known as the Downtown Camera Project (Hier et al., 
2007). 
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In 1999, members of FASE, in consort with members of the Downtown Safety 
Committee, initiated a two-year anti-violence campaign that led to the 
establishment of public CCTV surveillance in downtown London. They 
succeeded on the basis of a repertoire of political and communications activities. 
Among these activities were open-forum discussions and presentations to students 
at local high schools; meetings with national advisory groups, such as the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities (whom members of FASE successfully 
lobbied to demand increased criminal penalties for crimes involving knives); 
lobbying efforts to persuade the City of London‘s Community and Protective 
Services Board to cover outstanding costs for the monitoring programme; and a 
sustained letter-writing campaign to local news outlets to draw attention to violent 
crime on London‘s streets, as well as to FASE‘s proposed and preferred solutions 
(Hier et al., 2007: 735). 
Soon, the movement that initially aimed to eliminate violence in the downtown 
core was expanded to include other crimes such as purse snatchings, bank robberies, 
assaults, and the general safety of women and the elderly. During this effort, Goldie-
Ryder‘s mother also began to work as a media activist who published articles criticising 
the project‘s opponents based on an emotional appeal for safety. The Goldie-Ryder 
tragedy, the development of FASE, and all symbols of social disorder became articulated 
into the overall problems of risk and danger associated with crime.  
As the reaction to FASE suggests, such responses, and the self-reflexivity they 
foster, are not based simply on the dissemination of information about crime, but 
also on the aesthetic and symbolic dimensions to perceptions of crime and 
disorder that are shaped by emotions such as compassion and sympathy for 
victims and their families – what Boltanski (1999) conceptualizes as ‗distant 
suffering‘ (Hier et al., 2007: 736). 
In the second city discussed by Hier et al. (2007), the City of Brockville, Ontario 
was used as an example of a smaller Canadian location where the implication of a public 
monitoring project was rejected. It also represented the only location that the authors 
were aware of that CCTV was defeated based on a critical editorial campaign led by 
journalists which inspired substantial public resistance. In this case, the project was 
proposed by Brockville Chief of Police Barry King. Chief King applied for provincial 
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support for a Proceeds of Crime/Frontline Policing grant in the amount of $158,000 to 
install 8-10 cameras to monitor 15 city blocks in the downtown core. In an interview with 
Chief King on June 27
th
, 2005, Hier was advised that King‘s primary goals for the project 
were: to reduce the prevalence of break and enter crimes; to lower vandalism; to respond 
to altercations in the restaurant and bar district; and to identify stolen vehicles and 
suspects (Hier et al., 2007). In December 1998, King‘s grant proposal under the Futuristic 
Crime Prevention Initiative program was approved for $70,000. King then approached 
the City‘s Economic Development and Community Services Committee with his Safe 
Streets project proposal which approved the project in a 2 to 1 vote. Within a few days, 
the local newspaper, The Recorder and Times, ran a series of opinion articles under the 
titles of ―Is Brockville Ready for Big Brother?‖ (Philips, 1998), ―There‘s a Better Way to 
Keep our Downtown Safe‖ (MacLean, 1998), ―Invading Our Spaces‖ (Coward, 1998), 
―Cop Better than Camera‖ (Mather, 1998), ―We don‘t Need Video Surveillance‖ (Taylor, 
1999), and ―Cameras Should Be Last Resort‖ (Recorder and Times, 1999a. as cited by 
Hier et al., 2007).  
Essentially, the editorial committee of the local newspaper took the firm position 
that video surveillance represented a poor substitute for community policing and formed 
this opinion, based on the political knowledge of years of struggle between the city 
council and the Police Board (Hier et al., 2007). The editorial committee also argued that 
the proposal was not appropriate for the small town dynamics of Brockville, ―pitting 
small-town community privacy against big-city intrusive state surveillance‖, stating that 
the project was ―big –brother policing as a proxy for the erosion of small-town 
community living‖ (Hier et al., 2007). A local criminal lawyer took advantage of the 
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available column space to criticize the use of CCTV. Letters to the editor also took the 
position that the project was a ―technological quick-fix to address perceived social 
problems‖ that represented an ―admission of not being able to cope with the problems 
and a colossal waste of money‖ (Gillard and Gillard, 1999a; A6 as cited by Hier et al., 
2007). The strongest opposition came from the editorial board who wrote, ―A living 
breathing human exercising the good judgement of a well-trained police constable is light 
years ahead of a student sitting five kilometres away watching through the blinkered lens 
of a video camera‖ (Recorder and Times, 1999 as cited by Hier et al., 2007: 739).   
The next political step that the proposal was required to take after receiving its 
initial approval by the Economic Development and Community Services Committee was 
to gain consent from City Council. The Mayor, Ben TeKemp, had already voiced his 
support for the proposal and called for council approval following the newspaper articles 
and editorials. At this point, the city council remained evenly divided on the issue.  In the 
days prior to the meeting, city council members and the Mayor received numerous phone 
calls from the public voicing strong opposition to the proposal, resulting in an unanimous 
vote opposing the CCTV proposal at the council meeting.  As Mazur and Lee (1993) 
noted, ―news media not only identify issues for public discussion, but also frame the 
context in which issues and concerns are thought about, represented, contested, and 
reconfigured‖ (Hier et al., 2007: 740).  Hier et al. summarized the results of this second 
example as ―in the absence of a ‗signal crime‘ or other event that could be used to 
galvanize public support, there was no resonant moment around which public outrage and 
fear could mobilize‖ (Hier et al., 2007: 741).  
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In their third example, Hier et al. (2007) described a case which demonstrated 
resistance to the expansion of CCTV surveillance in the City of Peterborough, Ontario. 
Since 2001, the City has run a public CCTV programme consisting of 12 cameras which 
monitor the museum, marina, library, and the city‘s Millennium Park (Peeksker, 2005, as 
cited by Hier et al., 2007). In December 2003, the Restaurant and Bar Association 
proposed an expansion of video surveillance to include 24-hour coverage of the city‘s 
business and entertainment district and to target vandalism, public urination, graffiti, 
petty crime, litter, and panhandling (Sherk, 2004). The Association proposed to pay for 
the equipment and the installation costs at five intersections and recommended that the 
city pay for the ongoing maintenance and operation of the expanded system. A city staff 
member named Lance Sherk was assigned the task of conducting a comprehensive 
assessment and to provide specific recommendations based on the two public 
consultation processes held. The first session consisted of a series of four public 
information forums which attracted between 15-30 people. The second was a survey of 
business and property owners in the downtown core which resulted in a 12% return rate 
revealing that 83% of respondents were in favour. A second distribution of the survey to 
the Peterborough Chamber of Commerce resulted in a 6% response rate among the 820 
members with 80% being in favour. Over the four-month period of consultation, one 
principle interest group emerged, the Stop the Cameras Coalition (STCC), comprised of 
representatives from the Social Justice Coalition, the Peterborough New Democratic 
Party, and the Peterborough Coalition Against Poverty. This group worked to effectively 
sway public opinion which was predominantly in favour of the proposal initially, 
building public resistance to the expansion proposal by citing a flawed community 
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consultation process and a lack of realistic long-term costs for the system‘s operation. 
Given the growing opposition, Sherk‘s final recommendation to council was the 
formation of a stakeholder committee comprised of STCC and other representatives with 
the aim of investigating alternatives to cameras, to further define the need for monitoring, 
and, if cameras were to be become the agreed upon course of action, how they were to be 
implemented (Sherk, 2004 as cited by Hier et al., 2007).  Hier et al. (2007) noted that, at 
the time of their writing, the committee had met only once and had failed to reach 
agreement.   
Hier et al. (2007) used these three case studies to argue that non-official sources 
often played very active and important roles in defining public policy. Garland (2001) 
argued that a more generalized crime complex was developing which involved new ways 
of acting on growing levels of fear of crime and concerns for public safety.  
David Garland (2001) identifies two broad, interrelated sets of changes taking 
place in contemporary modes of criminal justice administration. The first pertains 
to changes in the political culture of crime control. He contends that the last few 
decades have been marked by an increase in the ‗emotionalization‘ of crime, 
characterized by discourse of victim-centeredness and ‗social defense‘, as well as 
the prioritization of situational crime prevention as predominant rationalities for 
crime control and criminal governance (Hier et al., 2006 as cited in Hier et al., 
2007: 742). 
What is apparent from the research cited above is that the emotionalization of a 
signal crime does not necessarily ensure the development of policy or decisions specific 
to CCTV implementation; the exact opposite can also occur.  In fact, the emotionalized 
citizen can oppose the substitution of a police officer with a camera just as much as the 
mother of a murdered son can mobilize a city to implement an unprecedented number of 
surveillance cameras.  In either case, CCTV‘s perceived efficacy, or lack thereof, can 
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determine how perceptions about crime, and the related emotionality about the efforts 
being undertaken to prevent crime, are expressed.  The challenges of measuring the 
public perception of CCTV relates, in many ways, to the same variety of environmental 
determinants and demographics that influence how citizens understand and perceive 
crime. The local media, action groups, and the presence or absence of a specific incident 
can all assist or counter the popular perception of CCTV as a remedy to crime. Because 
public perception is such a major determinant in CCTV‘s capacity to reduce perceptions 
about the level of crime, any assessment of this technology‘s success must consider the 
local role of publicity and politics in their presentation of CCTV.  Similarly, public 
perception is paramount to ensure that CCTV‘s implementation is a welcomed measure 
of security, particularly insofar as this technology is or is not viewed as an intrusion upon 
privacy.  As noted in the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner‘s report (2006), 
the rapid advancements in the use of video technology in both the private and public 
sector, and the growing perception that the use of video surveillance increases security, 
have posed very real threats to privacy, freedom of movement, and freedom of 
association.  
As noted by Norris et al., (2004), the political appeal of CCTV has often had less 
to do with its proven ability to reduce crime or fear of crime than the image and 
impression that the implementation of CCTV has for demonstrating that something is 
being done about the problem of crime. In the early 1990‘s, the mass expansion of state 
funded CCTV in Britain occurred before any systematic evaluation of whether or not it 
effectively reduced, prevented, or deterred crime. Overall, a number of small scale 
evaluations produced varying and often contradictory results (Norris et al., 2004).  And, 
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as Pawson and Tilley outlined (1994), politicians relied on the self-interested claims of 
practitioners and system promoters. In Welsh and Farrington‘s 2004 analysis of 22 
British and American evaluations which met their minimum requirements of scientific 
adequacy, the authors concluded that CCTV had a significant desirable effect on crime, 
although the overall reduction was only 4%.  And, while this may initially have looked 
like an endorsement of CCTV, it is worth noting that only half of the studies showed a 
positive effect on crime levels. The study further stated that CCTV had little or no effect 
on crime in city center and public transport settings.  The only statistically significant 
results were found in car parks (Norris et al., 2004). At different moments or as a result of 
various tragedies, CCTV has often been offered as the quick solution to public outcries 
about crime, terrorism, or shocking classroom murders. For example, in the U.S., Britain, 
and Russia, the response to killings in the classroom has resulted in a widespread 
introduction of CCTV in public school systems. Yet, the extent to which this approach 
works to prevent further tragedies is questionable. ―For politicians there is a need to be 
seen to be doing something.  And, as the psychological, social, or political conditions that 
give rise to such incidents are complex, and possibly intractable, technological fixes 
which promise the appearance, if not the reality of security are highly appealing‖ (Norris 
et al., 2004: 126). History has demonstrated that when significant incidents and crises 
occur, funding will be made available for CCTV despite the contradictory or lack of 
evidence of their effectiveness. This often occurs in the context of setting aside 
considerations of the effects of CCTV on legal, constitutional, or rights to privacy. When 
the argument is between security and civil liberties, often security is favoured.  Given 
this, the next chapter will look more closely at the issue of privacy and CCTV.
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Chapter Four:  Privacy Issues of CCTV   
One of the primary arguments against the use of public video surveillance systems 
is the challenge these systems pose to citizens‘ privacy rights and civil liberties. The use 
of camera surveillance subjects everyone to scrutiny, whether they have committed a 
crime or not, and, ―in the very least it circumscribes, if it does not eradicate outright, the 
expectation of privacy and anonymity that we have as we go about our daily business‖ 
(Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, March 2006: 1). To further 
complicate the issue, different countries have different legal systems and interpretations 
on the concept of ‗right to privacy‘, making comparisons, standardization, and unified 
expectations difficult. For example, in Britain, where CCTV is most prominent, the legal 
context is considered to be extremely permissive. Britain has no written constitution and 
until the incorporation of the Human Rights Act into British Law in the late 1990‘s, no 
statutory provision existed for the protection of privacy. This has resulted in a situation 
where no legal or constitutional apparatus exists to inhibit or challenge CCTV system 
development. ―Both the new Data Protection and Human Rights Acts have been toothless 
to prevent the expansion of CCTV and very weak at regulating it once in place‖ (Norris 
et al., 2004: 121). While not the case in Britain, the expansion of CCTV in other 
countries has typically been slowed by their legal and constitutional environments. For 
example, in Germany, the Constitutional Court stated that ―the knowledge of being under 
surveillance, why and by whom is crucial for a democratic society and the autonomy of 
its citizens‖ (Topfel, Hemple, & Cameron, 2003: 6).  A similar position exists in 
Denmark where there is a ―general legal presumption against the surveillance of public 
space by private bodies, and the explicit regulation of the use of photography by the 
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police‖ (Norris et al., 2004: 121). As well, Norway‘s privacy rights are protected by their 
constitution and a strong data regime that strictly regulates CCTV through a licensing 
requirement. Similarly, in Canada, the Supreme Court declared that to ―permit 
unrestricted video surveillance by agents of the state would seriously diminish the degree 
of privacy we can reasonably expect to enjoy in a free society‖ (cited in Deisman, 2003: 
18).  In the United States, CCTV has expanded very quickly in the private sector and, 
since 9/11, into public spaces. According to the Constitution Project‘s Guidelines for 
Public Video Surveillance, surveillance systems in the public realm impact many 
fundamental values, including privacy and anonymity, freedom of expression and 
association, government accountability and procedural safeguards, and equal protection 
and anti-discrimination (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security 
Committee, 2007).   
According to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Hong Kong‘s report 
(2003), an overview of the merits of various countries‘ policies specific to the use of 
CCTV was provided.  One conclusion was:  
The jurisdiction that has probably been most proactive in terms of regulating the 
use of public surveillance cameras is the State of New South Wales (―NSW‖) in 
Australia. In 1998, the NSW state government passed the Workplace Surveillance 
Act. Although this act does not explicitly address the use of surveillance cameras 
in public places, it did result in a NSW government initiative. In 2000, NSW 
issued a Government Policy Statement and Guidelines for the Establishment and 
Implementation of CCTV in Public Places the substance of which was derived 
from the 1998 legislation. More importantly, it led to the NSW police issuing a 
Police Service Policy on the Development and Use of CCTV which explicitly 
states that the NSW police will neither fund nor operate CCTV equipment that 
may be used in the detection or prevention of crime (Report by the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data - Hong Kong SAR, 2003: 4). 
 48 
This statement was further clarified in the Hong Hong report with a footnote stating that, 
the police service in Australia will not routinely monitor CCTV cameras, and that the role 
of the police service would be to respond to the incidents as identified by control room 
operators, or in specific cases such as in emergency situations, the police could monitor 
for specific incidents to determine the appropriate response (Report by the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data - Hong Kong SAR, 2003). 
The legal concern for the protection of privacy rights faces new challenges in 
light of CCTV‘s recent technological advances. One concern for individual privacy came 
from the aftermath of the bombings on London‘s subway and bus system in July 2005, 
where, despite using CCTV for the efficient identification of the bombers, British 
authorities stated that an awareness and responsibility of meeting the requirements of the 
justice system, such as those considered fundamental values in other democratic 
countries, including freedom of expression, association, non-discriminatory practice, and 
government accountability, will become an imperative component to ensuring CCTV‘s 
continued success. ―It should be our collective aim and responsibility to ensure that, as 
well as the need to keep up with technical developments in the industry as a whole, 
improvements in provision remain consistent with the requirements of the CJS and with 
the needs of the Court Service in particular‖ (Home Office; National CCTV Strategy, 
October 2007: 4). In response, the Home Office published a report bringing attention to 
the advances in technology and the legal balance between data protection, privacy, and 
human rights legislation. ―Recognising data protection and privacy rights in the operation 
of all systems is not only important because the law requires us to do so, but also that it is 
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right that we should do so, with concerns about surveillance so apparent in our everyday 
lives‖  (Home Office; National CCTV Strategy, October 2007: 4).  
Despite this new recognition of privacy and individuals rights and freedoms, the 
UK‘s implementation of CCTV in the area of public safety and investigation has taken 
place in an unplanned and ―piecemeal fashion with little strategic direction, control, or 
regulation‖ (Home Office; National CCTV Strategy, October 2007: 5).  One key 
contributing factor to this was the ―involvement of the central government in committing 
over a billion pounds to facilitate the deployment of open street CCTV‖ (Norris et al., 
2004: 122). Norris et al., stated that not only was it the amount of funding available, but 
also the manner in which it was allocated that lead to the piecemeal and rapid growth.  In 
effect, the funding was distributed using a competitive bidding process which stimulated 
a demand beyond the initial limits of the funding.  Projects were to involve partnerships 
between the police, local business elites, and local authorities which effectively created 
powerful alliances committed to the installation of CCTV regardless of the outcome of 
the competitive process. This resulted in many groups who were not initially funded 
finding alternative sources of funding or to lobby for another round of competition 
(Norris et al., 2004).  In a report submitted to the Home Office, the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) proposed new managerial standards to improve the organization 
of CCTV; among these standards were those pertaining to the protection of individual 
privacy rights, such as the need for clear guidelines on registration, inspection, and 
enforcement, as well as a unified standardization of storage, archiving, and retention of 
information acquired through CCTV (Home Office; National CCTV Strategy, October 
2007). 
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Compared to the UK, the US has progressed very well in the area of developing 
guidelines specific to ensuring that individual rights are not violated by CCTV systems. 
This progress can, in part, be attributed to the libertarian culture of America, in which 
privacy advocates believe the use of widespread and on-going government surveillance 
poses a serious threat to a society that prides itself on individual rights, autonomy, and 
freedom from government intrusion (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and 
Security Committee, 2007). One indication of this progress is the existence of  the 
Constitution Project, a liberty and security committee of a bipartisan, non-profit 
organization who published a document entitled ―Guidelines for Public Video 
Surveillance - A guide to protecting communities and preserving civil liberties‖ in 2007.  
This organization seeks consensus on controversial legal and political issues through 
scholarship and advocacy. The intent of the guidelines outlined in the report were to 
assist state and local officials responsible for designing, authorizing, and managing public 
video surveillance systems. The guidelines were intended to ―meet the challenge of 
reconciling Americans‘ strong and legitimate interest in protection against terrorism and 
other dangers with their longstanding and constitutionally-enshrined commitment to 
individual freedom‖ (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security 
Committee, 2007: xii).  Specific recommendations addressed the potential for violating 
privacy rights through the technological developments being made in CCTV, which, as 
noted in the introductory section of this paper, include observation technologies, 
recording technologies, tracking technologies, and identification technologies. The report 
also included a final section addressing enhancements which may be implemented to 
offset the negative effect of surveillance on constitutional rights and values, including the 
 51 
rights of privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. New technologies 
have also emerged that can alleviate some of the invasive effects of the technology.  For 
instance, camera systems can be set up to not pan, tilt, or zoom in ways that capture 
private spaces, such as into windows or private residences.  In a similar way, technology, 
such as ‗digital masking‘, can hide faces of individuals not being targeted or specifically 
observed. Other measures included protecting recorded data from easy disclosure or 
access through encryptions or ―watermarks‖ which either restrict access to data or record 
when and where the data was last accessed (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty 
and Security Committee, 2007). The guidelines document also provided a list of 
established mechanisms to protect the rights of identifiable individuals captured on video 
surveillance. These mechanisms include:  notice and awareness – the community should 
be made aware if a system exists and how it collects, possesses, or uses personally 
identifiable information from video surveillance; consent – use or sharing of information 
collected by a video surveillance system outside its intended purpose should only be done 
if consent to do so has been obtained by the individual or in such a way as to not reveal 
the identification of the person, if consent is not provided;  access and participation – 
individuals should have the right to request access to their identified appearances and 
have an opportunity to amend or correct any errors or inaccuracies; and integrity and 
security – authorities must take precautions to secure all data (Report of the Constitution 
Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007). As noted in the previous chapter, non-
official sources, such as victims, the media, and politicians can often play very active and 
important roles in defining public policy.  As such, they can also be key participants in 
ensuring that the technologies are ―designed and used to not only protect citizens against 
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crime and terrorism, but also in ways that preserve accountability, procedural safeguards, 
and constitutionally protected rights of privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
association‖ (Report of the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007: 
36).   
The Constitution Project suggested that CCTV be implemented only to further a 
clearly articulated law enforcement purpose, and that all assessments of CCTV‘s effect 
on constitutional rights accompany any use of this technology so that measures can be 
taken against its misuse or abuse. To ensure public awareness of CCTV‘s presence and 
its potential effect, any decision to use public video surveillance should be made in an 
open and publicly accountable process.  Such a process would require, especially in the 
case of permanent or long-term public video surveillance systems, a civil liberties impact 
assessment and overall cost-benefit analysis that included community input. The 
Constitution Project recommended that those responsible for the temporary 
implementation of CCTV demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that the system had no 
greater scope or capabilities than were reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose. The Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Initiative 
recommended to law and decision makers at all levels of government that they carefully 
assess the design and use of the potentially dangerous new technologies of surveillance. 
As such, they provided the guidelines as a ―useful framework for protecting core 
constitutional freedoms and social values in a world of technologically-assisted law 
enforcement and real, serious threats to public safety‖ (Report of the Constitution 
Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee, 2007: 36).    
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 In a similar effort, the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) 
developed extensive guidelines in an effort to evaluate whether a system was justified, 
from its planning phases through to implementation and evaluation, to limit the risk to 
privacy and individual rights (Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner Guidelines, March, 2006). The OPC guidelines were developed by a 
working group comprised of representatives from stakeholder groups, RCMP, and OPC 
personnel as a result of a 2001 investigation specific to the use of video cameras in 
Kelowna, British Columbia (Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
Guidelines, March, 2006).    
 As a result of the investigations of video surveillance activities by the Federal 
Privacy Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Kelowna, a 
press release was published in Ottawa in the form of a letter from The Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, George Radwanski, to David Loukidelis, Information and 
Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia. The letter provided a detailed argument 
supporting a finding that the cameras in Kelowna were in contravention to the Privacy 
Act. From the perspective of privacy rights, video surveillance by the state can only be 
justified when it was demonstrated that keeping the peace could not be accomplished by 
any other less privacy-invasive means. Solid evidence is required in each case to justify 
the use of generalized video surveillance, rather than other traditional means of law 
enforcement. Convenience, efficiency, or cost savings should never qualify as evidence. 
Video surveillance of Canadians by the state should be the very rare exception, not the 
norm (Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2001). 
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 In a report conducted by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in Hong Kong 
(2003), the Kelowna case was outlined because of the proceedings which ensued when 
the Canadian Federal Privacy Commissioner became involved in litigation with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in British Columbia. The conflict over the Kelowna 
CCTV system began on June 25, 2001, after British Columbia's Information and Privacy 
commissioner complained about the cameras to the federal Privacy Commissioner. As 
noted in the 2003 report, the Privacy Commissioner sought legal counsel and filed an 
action in British Columbia‘s Supreme Court in an effort to obtain a ruling which would 
instruct the RCMP to decommission public surveillance cameras in the City of Kelowna. 
The Commissioner‘s case was based on the position that the surveillance of law-abiding 
citizens in public places by the RCMP was unconstitutional and in contravention of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Canadian Commissioner announcd that, 
in his opinion, the RCMP, in their surveillance activities in Kelowna, violated 
international covenants on human rights (Report by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner for Personal Data - Hong Kong SAR, 2003: 4).  
Privacy is a fundamental human right, recognized as such by the United Nations. 
The level and quality of privacy in our country risks being struck a crippling, 
irreparable blow if we allow ourselves to become subjected to constant, 
unrelenting surveillance and observation through the lens of proliferating video 
cameras controlled by the police or any other agents of the state (Government of 
Canada, Office of the Privacy Commission, 2001). 
As noted on the Canadian Broadcast Corporation‘s (CBC) website, the B.C. Supreme 
Court refused to hear the case, stating that the Privacy Commissioner had exceeded his 
jurisdiction and the lawsuit was withdrawn (Retrieved September 12, 2008 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnsecurity/cameras.html).     
 55 
 The Canadian guidelines developed as part of the legislative response to 
Kelowna‘s (2001) CCTV use were specifically limited to public surveillance systems 
primarily used in parks and on streets. These guidelines applied to ―overt general video 
surveillance by law enforcement agencies—what some police forces refer to as 
‗community cameras‘—in places to which the public has largely free and unrestricted 
access, such as streets or public parks‖ (Retrieved June 15, 2007 from 
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/vs_060301_e.asp).  They also concerned the 
―continuous or periodic video recording, observing, or monitoring of individuals in open, 
public spaces, in the absence of particularized suspicion of an individual or individuals‖ 
(Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commission, 2001: 
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/vs_060301_e.asp). The guidelines were not 
intended to interfere with the work and decisions of either the RCMP or the OPC and 
specifically recognized the importance for autonomous decision making to remain in 
place for both agencies in order to continue to carry out their respective duties 
(Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commission, 2001).  
Like the Constitution Project, the Canadian guidelines insisted that public 
surveillance be used only under pressing circumstances, such as in areas of high crime, 
where other interventions have failed, or in cases of potential threats to national security, 
such as at borders. The guidelines also specified that consideration of the effect of CCTV 
on individual rights to privacy, as well as a process of public consultation, should be 
undertaken before CCTV was implemented.  The public must be notified of the 
surveillance, and all laws applying to the collection and distribution of Canadians‘ 
personal information must be applied equally to all data acquired through the use of 
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CCTV. Operators of CCTV must be aware of and trained to protect citizens‘ rights to 
privacy. The Canadian guidelines also recommended the regular evaluation and auditing 
of public surveillance systems by independent parties to ensure there was a sustained 
need for its usage (Government of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2001). 
At the provincial level, a document entitled, ―Public Surveillance System 
Guidelines – Office of the Information & Privacy Commissioner for B.C.‖, written in 
January 2001, included a model privacy impact assessment and a blank assessment form 
for use by public bodies. This Privacy Impact Assessment form was intended to 
determine how a proposed video surveillance system might effect privacy. According to 
its protocols, the document, along with a detailed business plan, must be submitted to the 
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of B.C. ―well before any final 
decision is made to proceed with surveillance‖ (Government of Canada, Office of the 
Privacy Commission, 2001:5). 
An example of municipally orchestrated guidelines for the preservation of 
citizens‘ rights to privacy is the City of Toronto, Ontario which began to investigate the 
use of public safety cameras in February 2006. As a result of the research, which 
included public consultations, a review of best practices, and Privacy guidelines, a 
document entitled ―Toronto Police Service - Public Space Cameras‖ was released in 
April 2007. The document provided a detailed overview of the city‘s camera program 
decision making process, program criteria and rationale, photos of cameras and samples 
of signage, a list of specific deployment locations, recording and observation policies, 
next steps, and contacts for more information. A second document outlined answers to 
 57 
frequently asked questions. Both documents remain available to the public and can be 
found on the Toronto Police Service website (Toronto Police Service, April 2007). The 
importance or value of these guidelines is the development of processes used to provide a 
level of consistency across systems. In turn, this allows for a simplified approach or 
reference document for agencies considering CCTV implementation and enables the 
establishment of base line data for research or comparison purposes.   
In a dedicated effort to ensure privacy concerns are respected, the Canadian OPC 
has developed the following recommended 15 guidelines for consideration in the 
development, deployment, and management of CCTV systems in Canada (Government 
of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commission, 2001: 
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/vs_060301_e.asp). 
1. Video surveillance should only be deployed to address a real, pressing, and 
substantial problem, backed up with evidence based on crime statistics, an 
evaluation of risks, and specified incidents of public safety concerns, crime, or 
compelling circumstance. 
2. Video surveillance should be viewed as an exceptional step, only to be 
implemented in circumstances where other, less privacy-invasive alternatives 
have been exhausted.  
3. The impact on privacy of the video surveillance system should be assessed 
prior to implementation utilizing a tool such as the Privacy Impact 
Assessment forms made available through the OPC website in an effort to 
determine the potential actual degree of interference with privacy which may 
result, or any adverse effects that may be prevented or reduced. 
4. Public consultation with all relevant stakeholders should be conducted prior to 
any decision for video surveillance implementation. The potentially affected 
community should be broadly understood and defined to extend beyond just 
geographical boundaries; one group should not be presumed to speak for all 
others.  
5. Video surveillance must only be applied according to all applicable laws, 
including those within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
Quebec‘s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.  
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6. The video surveillance system should be streamlined to ensure a minimal 
impact on privacy. For example, operational limitations on times of day, event 
specific intervals, and peak periods could be considered.  
7. The public should be notified and advised that video surveillance is in 
operation and that they may be subject to scrutiny.  This should be done with 
clearly written signage at the perimeter of areas under surveillance and should 
also indicate who is responsible for the surveillance, including statements of 
compliance with privacy principles and who to contact for more information 
or questions about the system.     
8. All information gathered through video surveillance should be minimal, its 
use and retention should be restricted, its disclosure controlled, and its 
destruction guaranteed.  If the camera is to be manned by an operator, it 
should only be turned on in the event of an observed or suspected infraction.  
If the camera is to be running continuously, the images should be kept for a 
limited period of time according to a specified retention schedule, unless they 
have documented a suspected infraction or are for use in a criminal 
investigation that has been reported to the police. The collected information 
must be only used according to its specified purpose as outlined by the police 
force or public authority in an explicitly stated policy (see point 14) and all 
release of information should be documented. 
9. Surveillance should not extend into areas where an expectation of privacy 
exists, such as into windows, showers, washrooms, and change rooms. If a 
camera can be adjusted by an operator, reasonable steps should be taken to 
ensure the camera cannot be manipulated to capture images in areas other than 
within their intended use.  
10. System operators should be trained with management systems in place 
according to specific expectations and rules designed to ensure the protection 
of privacy. 
11. There must be an assurance of security of the equipment and images with 
limited access to only authorized individuals as specified in writing according 
to the developed policy (see point 14). As well, recordings should be securely 
held and access granted on a need-to-know basis only.  
12. The right for individuals to have access to their personal information should 
be respected, and policies and procedures must be in place to ensure it. An 
understanding that it may also be necessary to blur or block out the image of 
others captured at the same time must also be ensured.  
13. Processes for independent, regular, and frequent audits and evaluation of the 
video surveillance system should be in place to identify any unintended 
negative effects of the system. Evaluations should include a comparison of the 
reasons the surveillance was implemented with how it is being utilized to 
ensure that it is only addressing the specified problem. Evaluations might also 
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determine that the system can be terminated for reasons, such as it is no longer 
required or because it does not meet its outlined purpose. Evaluations should 
also take into consideration the input from a variety of groups within as well 
as outside of the community affected by the surveillance and results of audits 
and evaluations should be made available to the public.   
14. Explicit policies should govern the use of the video surveillance. The policy 
must be in writing and should clearly outline the rationale and purpose of the 
system, the location and field of vision of the equipment, the rationale and 
purpose of each specific location and selected fields of vision, which 
personnel are authorized to operate the system, the times the surveillance will 
be in effect, when the surveillance will take place, the place where the signals 
from the equipment will be monitored and received, and the fair information 
principles which will apply to the recordings, including their security, use, 
disclosure, retention, destruction, rights to access, and rights to challenge. As 
well, the policy should clearly designate who is responsible for privacy 
compliance and privacy rights associated with the system. Compliance to 
policy by officers, employees, and contractors, and sanctions for non-
compliance should be outlined within the policy. Additionally, processes 
should be outlined in the event of a breach to security or privacy, as well as 
for requests to challenge compliance with the policy.  
15. Police forces and public authorities should be prepared to provide the public 
with access to information about surveillance systems upon request, including 
what information has been captured, what the images are used for, who has 
access, and how long the images are retained. 
With organizations at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels endeavouring 
to guide the implementation of CCTV in ways which preserve individual rights, Canada‘s 
present situation of public surveillance can be summarized as one in which the increasing 
powers to invade privacy are faced with the counter-measures focusing on citizens‘ 
rights.  Although a context of improved technological abilities, and the public‘s 
perception of the quality and quantity of crime, have promoted the view that an 
increasingly monitored society is warranted, this context of ability and concern has not 
eroded Canada‘s prioritization of privacy. According to the Canadian Broadcast 
Corporation‘s on-line article, even though the evidence appears controversial, Canadians 
remain optimistic about the potential advantages of CCTV.  At the same time, Canadians 
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are sensitive to the possible privacy implications that surveillance systems can provoke 
(CBC, retrieved September 12 2008; 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnsecurity/cameras.html).   As such, the development 
of effective management of the systems will be a crucial component of a successful 
CCTV implementation plan or proposal. For example, the physical setting and planned 
purpose of the camera technology plays a large part in determining how the system is 
implemented. If the system is to be used in public streets, consideration must be given to 
advising the public of its existence. As well, guidelines must be established for the 
management of the data, the processes and procedures for monitoring the system, the 
training and screening of personnel, and the procedures for how to manage a suspicious 
event. It is also recommended that each camera application be treated as a unique entity, 
yet planned according to a consistent set of guiding principles (International Association 
of Chiefs of Police Executive Brief, 2001). Processes and procedures for screening and 
training of staff specific to the use of the technology, as well as the liabilities, should also 
be well planned and consistently implemented. As such, appropriate and regular training 
is a mandatory component of well managed CCTV systems. The training should be 
ongoing and should occur on a variety of topics, including public perception, changing 
technologies, industry trends, evaluation, and operations. Training also serves to ensure 
the system is being properly managed and utilized, and allows for regular evaluation and 
performance reviews (International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive Brief 
Executive Brief, 2001).  Given the complexities and potential for privacy concerns, it is 
imperative that systems be implemented and managed with comprehensive strategies, 
plans, and policies in place.  For these reasons, the next chapter provides a more in-depth 
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examination of the operational and management considerations for CCTV 
implementation. 
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Chapter Five:  Operational and Management Considerations 
As outlined in the National CCTV Strategy in the UK (2007), the use of CCTV in 
policing services is a tool that ―today provides a higher percentage of investigational 
evidence than any other form‖ (National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 21). The report also 
noted that the rapid and ‗piecemeal‘ development of systems throughout Britain was done 
with little or no control, regulation, or strategic direction which resulted in a ―pressing 
need to examine existing standards, procedures, training, and methods of operation‖ 
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 5). Additionally, the police, system operators, and courts 
are faced with the challenges associated with the systems being changed over from 
analogue to digital technology. Prior to the change in technology, the use of analogue 
tapes required officers to be trained in retrieving and compiling evidence. The more 
recent technological change to digital systems has transformed a formerly simple task 
into an even more diverse and involved process requiring new technical skills, increased 
levels of awareness, and an advanced understanding of the specifics of the system given 
its range of complexities and capabilities (National CCTV Strategy, 2007). Furthermore, 
the uncoordinated approach which occurred in the development of CCTV systems in 
Britain presented challenges in terms of system compatibility, the cost of assessing 
images, and limitations in overall system effectiveness (National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 
5).  Given the growing use of CCTV technology in criminal prosecutions, all of the 
standards, details of the procedures, and expanded levels of training must be 
complementary to ensure that the entire process, ranging from the earliest stage of 
evidence capture, to the criminal proceedings are to the highest standards (National 
CCTV Strategy, 2007). In addition to the police, the camera operators, system analysts, 
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program managers, and staff at all levels of CCTV operations must attain and maintain 
the training and enhanced skills necessary to perform their job functions, especially given 
that the system should be expected to continue to evolve and change as the technology 
develops. The Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in the 
UK have recognized in their joint report entitled `National CCTV Strategy` (2007) that, 
to date, there has been inadequate training of staff at all levels specific to the CCTV 
applications across England. The report stated that there was no consistent training and 
standards in place for CCTV staff.  And, while it may seem an obvious component of a 
sound program or strategy, the report stated that ―... the proper training for all users of 
CCTV is crucial to its successful deployment and effective use‖ (National CCTV 
Strategy, 2007: 21). 
A system can be rendered ineffective if the system user is unsure how to fully use 
the system, and of what relevance the images might be. Further, the inadequate, 
and, in many respects, total lack of training for operators mean that some systems 
and software applications installed in the control rooms are seldom or never used. 
It is clear that in many cases, CCTV is not being used to its full advantage 
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 21). 
 
In the UK, the Security Industry Authority (SIA) developed a licensing process 
which came into effect on March 20, 2006. The effect of this licensing process was that 
all front-line workers were required to receive and maintain training standards 
appropriate to their level of work. The legislation addressed minimum training standards 
and the ‗Skills for Security National Occupational Standards‘ which led to improvements 
and higher standards for security consultants and CCTV operators given that operators 
were now expected to attain and maintain a standardized skill set and a specified level of 
understanding.  It essentially became illegal to work as a CCTV operator without 
maintaining a valid SIA licence. This requirement resulted in all front-line staff being 
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expected to achieve the training requirement, and resulted in an increased skill level 
among employees (National CCTV Strategy, 2007).  However, this new expectation was 
not extended to police officers. During the consultation phase, police officers, most of 
who were working regularly with CCTV footage and in close consultation with control 
room staff, received no formal training. It was noted in the National Strategy report that 
the relationship between police officers and control room staff was an important one and 
the recommendation was made to ensure it was further strengthened and developed in 
order to achieve the maximum benefit for evidence gathering and successful deployment 
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007). Critically, if the police were not included in the 
licensing and training standards, further gaps could develop in the skills of those working 
with CCTV resulting in potential miscommunication, a possible lack of knowledge of 
potential areas of concern or system capability, and potentially an overall underutilization 
of the CCTV system.  An example of this would be in the case of images being 
transferred from one system to another.  If staff within each agency are not equally 
qualified, the potential of miscommunication, misunderstanding, or a disparity of 
expectations could occur. Another identified challenge with the current licensing process 
was that not all staff within the control room were required to receive the training. Yet, in 
other cases, some control room managers chose to extend the training opportunities to all 
staff.  The result of this flexibility in management was that some CCTV sites had a 
greater percentage of trained personnel across a larger number of staffing levels than 
others, thus creating an imbalance. The problem with this was that inconsistency across 
systems made comparisons, evaluations, and links incomplete. Another disparity between 
CCTV operations in the new training model was that, under the current legislation, 
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standards could not be applied to CCTV installers, yet they were recognized as a key part 
of the overall system. As well, CCTV managers may not have experience with this 
technology resulting in a lack of understanding of the training issues and needs ―which in 
turn create a disparity in the resources and training opportunities that are open to CCTV 
staff from one control room to another‖ (National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 22). Finally, 
because a number of different agencies were working on training and the development of 
training standards, there was an identified need to bring these agencies together to 
evaluate their proposals and examine their separate findings. From the evidence gathered 
by the research team of the National Strategy in 2007, it was clear that cooperation, 
engagement, and communication were key characteristics of an effective CCTV 
partnership. For this reason, it is imperative that all stakeholders be identified and invited 
into the engagement process in order to achieve optimum results not only for each 
system, but across systems, as well as nationally. Ideally, a multi-agency approach must 
be implemented. (National CCTV Strategy, 2007). Additionally, according to the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the local prosecutor‘s office should 
also be involved in the communication, education, and consultation phases in order to 
provide specific advice on how the use of the cameras and their technology to increase 
the chances of a successful prosecution. Similarly, if the cameras are intended to be 
utilized to monitor public spaces, consideration should be given to notify and involve the 
public in the consultation (International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive Brief 
Executive Brief, 2001). Ideally, public involvement, discussion, and education are 
necessary steps in the development of a successful CCTV implementation plan. Although 
the number of system administrators who have a clear process of surveying public 
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expectations and measuring responses after implementation is uncertain, both forms of 
assessment are recommended.  For example, if a general survey indicated that people 
believed CCTV systems would reduce crime, it would makes sense for decision makers 
to measure levels of crime prior to implementation and at regular evaluation points to 
determine if the expectation was being achieved. These results should also be 
communicated to the public at regular intervals to maintain their support for and 
awareness of the system. Another potential complication identified by the National 
Strategy committee in the UK (2007) was that no one model or agency held responsibility 
―for developing the integrated use of CCTV at either the local or national level. It was 
agreed that a strategic direction is needed to ensure the coordinated growth of CCTV‖ 
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007: 44). 
 Beyond the considerations required for training, consultation, and the existence of 
a body to administer CCTV both locally and nationally, the UK National Strategy report 
also identified a need for the development of clearly articulated policies concerning the 
type of equipment being used, who would be responsible for operating the system, and 
the overall procedures of operation. Details specific to tape storage and handling must 
also be considered. ―According to some legal experts, many questions surround the 
storage and maintenance of information, including whether tapes are reused and how 
soon they can be erased‖ (IACP Executive Brief, 2001: 9).  In 2000, a survey conducted 
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) gathered information from 
over 200 US law enforcement agencies across the country with the goal of ascertaining 
current applications of CCTV and video surveillance technology to assess its effect in the 
field.  The survey, as outlined in their executive brief dated March 2001, found that many 
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police officers using CCTV technology occupied the dual roles of operations and 
administration, which included operating, maintaining, collecting, storing, and disposing 
of CCTV tapes (IACP Executive Brief Executive Brief, 2001). ―Eighty-one percent of 
police departments use numeric records to store and track videotapes. Fifty-seven percent 
record over tapes one to ten times before discarding them, and seventy-one percent store 
tapes for more than 30 days‖ (International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive 
Brief Executive Brief, 2001: 9). The potential problems with this could involve privacy 
concerns over how long information is held, and the likelihood of an increase in potential 
misuse or error as the length of time increases. The IACP research (2001) also 
determined that policy was not keeping pace with the increasingly varied use of CCTV. 
This finding was based on 53% of survey respondents expressing the need for policy to 
assist them with decision making (International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive 
Brief Executive Brief, 2001). As a result of this expressed need, many agencies have 
designed guidelines of operation on their own without collaboration or information 
sharing between agencies (International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive Brief 
Executive Brief, 2001). It is also evident that some agencies utilized ideas from what 
works in other jurisdictions, while others developed their own operating procedures 
without a clear idea of what they really needed or should consider given their unique 
settings.  Ideally, a set of recommendations or sample guidelines would assist agencies in 
selecting or utilizing the ideas best suited to their needs. 
The IACP, in collaboration with the Security Industry Association (SIA), hosted a 
two-day summit called CCTV for Public Safety and Community Policing in April 
1999. Guidelines relating to responsible use of CCTV in public safety and 
community policing applications were proposed. These guidelines were circulated 
to law enforcement agencies and CCTV manufacturers across the United States 
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for review and comments (International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive 
Brief Executive Brief: 10).    
The jointly developed guidelines recommended that CCTV be implemented with 
the community, local government, and the enforcement agency‘s involvement in the 
location of installation. All three of these parties need to understand CCTV‘s function. 
The IACP believed that a program oversight body, consisting of law enforcement and 
community representatives, would assist in gaining community support for CCTV. With 
the intent of developing guidelines on the  appropriate use of CCTV technology within 
the public sector while ensuring privacy issues were respected, the IACP Private Sector 
Liaison Committee initiated a CCTV summit (IACP, CCTV Guidelines, 2001). The 
Summit participants included CCTV manufacturers, law enforcement organizations, civil 
liberty organizations, tort and constitutional lawyers, state and federal regulators, and 
local citizens groups. Despite the frequency of CCTV use on the national and local levels, 
there were no consistent policies or procedures in place to guide the use of this 
technology. Given the ethical, legal, and other important issues implicated in the use of 
CCTV technology in the public sector, the members of SIA, IACP, and NSA 
recommended that public safety officials and law enforcement agencies adopt some or all 
of the written guidelines they developed to assist and facilitate the ethical and 
standardized use of CCTV in the local community (IACP, CCTV Guidelines, 2001). The 
overall recommendations of the participants in the study by the International Association 
of the Chiefs of Police (IACP 2001) were to limit and control circumstances in which 
CCTV would be used to include areas in the public where there was no expectation of 
privacy, ―including unenclosed areas (public streets, sidewalks, and parks, etc.) and 
enclosed areas (building lobbies, corridors and elevators, etc.) To qualify as a 
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constitutionally protected ―reasonable expectation of privacy,‖ the individual must have 
an actual expectation of privacy and that expectation must be one which society 
recognizes as reasonable‖ (IACP, CCTV Guidelines, 2001: 6).  For example, even though 
the place called ‗public washrooms‘ utilized the term ‗public‘ as a descriptor, there was 
an expectation of privacy in all washrooms; therefore, areas such as public washrooms 
and change rooms would not utilize CCTV.  
The courts have consistently found that an individual does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when he or she is in a public place. Behaviour and activity 
exhibited in a public area is obviously available for observation by others. Police 
observation of activities conducted in plain view in a public place, therefore, does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and 
seizure, regardless of whether the observation occurs through the physical 
presence of a person at the scene or through the assistance of CCTV technology. 
Similarly, there is no violation of personal privacy rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment when an individual‘s public behaviour is observed by a video camera  
(IACP, CCTV Guidelines, 2001: 6).   
 
Even though the American courts determined that CCTV cameras in public places were 
not a violation to an individual‘s privacy, the IACP‘s CCTV Guidelines emphasized the 
ethical and responsible use of CCTV technology as a tool for use in public safety and 
security, and were critical components of the success of current and future public safety 
applications of CCTV and other evolving technologies. The guidelines were designed in 
such as a way as to answer commonly asked questions, and then to outline very specific 
and easy to understand guidelines. 
Similarly, in the fall of 2005, in Britain, a paper was presented to the Home Office 
Crime Reduction Delivery Board (CRDB) by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) which argued for a multi-agency approach to determine the needs and views of 
all stakeholders interested in or currently working on the development of CCTV in public 
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spaces. The Home Office agreed to the recommendations and committed to forming a 
joint team of ACPO and CRDB representatives tasked with two main goals: (1) to review 
the current CCTV infrastructure to establish its effectiveness in terms of crime and 
disorder reduction and detection;  and (2) through consultation with various agencies, to 
develop a strategy that improved the effective use of CCTV in terms of crime and 
disorder reduction and detection, taking into account developing technology and threats 
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007). 
 The team‘s work began in January 2006 and involved a series of workshops with 
various stakeholders and experts, as well as consultation exercises at a variety of 
conferences, including the ACPO/HOSDM CCTV conference with Town Centre CCTV 
Managers, the Thinking Strategically about CCTV conference in March of 2006, and the 
CCTV Users Group Conferences held in April and October 2006, and in April 2007. A 
number of smaller meetings were also held with the Information Commissioner‘s Office 
(ICO), the ACPO Digital Imaging Project Board, ACPO ANPR, CCTV User Group, the 
Public CCTV Managers Association (PCMA), town centre managers, and other 
interested groups. During this information gathering phase, the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA) was also being formed. The work that emerged involved 
the analysis of the information gathered.  It became clear that the data collected could be 
categorized into ten broad issues:  the need for standards in all aspects of CCTV; the need 
for clear guidelines on registration, inspection, and enforcement; training of all personnel; 
the police use of CCTV; storage/volume/archiving/retention issues; the need for CCTV 
Networks – live and stored; equipping, resourcing, and standardisation within the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS); emerging technologies/changing threats/new and 
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changing priorities; partnership working; and financial and resource management 
(National CCTV Strategy, 2007). 
  The following concerns and conclusions were determined through the 
consultation with key stakeholders. Incompatible systems have led to the police 
employing specialist technical staff to recover and process digital CCTV footage as the 
CJS had difficulty playing back the formats being used.  In terms of standardizing 
images, the picture quality of CCTV systems varied considerably and was often far from 
ideal, especially if was being used for primary identification of a suspect and 
identification was being sought.  Furthermore, it was recommended that existing pan-tilt-
zoom (PTZ) cameras be supplemented with fixed cameras capable of continually 
providing good quality images for post-investigation use.  Other concerns raised included 
the outdated and difficult to read nature of the operational guide and supplementary 
documentation. This is currently being reviewed and is being brought up to date.  There 
was also a vast difference and variance in the quality and usefulness of the business 
processes employed across the CCTV landscape. Finally, because it is unclear how 
accurate previous estimates of camera numbers were, consultation with local authorities 
was an ongoing effort aimed at determining an accurate number. This uncertainty also 
extended to the exact location of all deployed cameras and whether they were covering 
the correct areas, if the images they produced were useful for their intended purpose, and 
whether they were being used effectively by the police. Without a better understanding of 
the degree of coverage, or clearer and more supported end to end procedures, future 
guidance around common standards in all the areas of concern will fall far short of what 
is required to ensure a meaningful, strategic program. Increased CCTV effectiveness can 
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be achieved if actively monitored town centre CCTV schemes are also encouraged to 
monitor existing CCTV systems in other largely public areas, such as railway/tube 
stations, and, where possible, onboard CCTV in buses, the subways, and train carriages 
extending to shopping centres, football stadiums, and arenas; thus, creating a de-facto 
hub for public space CCTV. It should be the aim of those responsible for the management 
of the system that such monitoring is carried out in a fully coordinated way (National 
CCTV Strategy, 2007). 
In 2007, the development of a draft strategy was circulated back to all the 
stakeholders for input.  A new board was then tasked with acting on the 
recommendations (National CCTV Strategy, 2007). The final recommendations of the 
Home Office‘s report were as follows: 
 Establish digital CCTV standards based on agreement between the police, 
the criminal justice system, and CCTV operators. Ideally, one format of 
digital video would be agreed upon and managed by a technical standards 
group. 
 Standards should be set more generally by a broader stakeholder group 
with the goal of looking at national and international CCTV standards.  
One of the ways this might be achieved is through the involvement of 
national and international standard setting bodies designed to seek 
collaboration between industry, and national and international policing 
organizations. 
 Continue the review of the British operational requirements manual with 
the completed manual being designed as a user friendly guide to provide 
guidance on recommended minimum image quality, as well as how to test 
the systems once they are installed. 
 Review the purpose and location of all CCTV cameras - owners of all 
systems should be required to conduct a review of all cameras being used 
in public space with details of their purpose and an analysis of whether the 
cameras meet their intended purpose.  
 73 
 Develop a ‗partnership working governance body‘ aimed at organizing a 
national strategy to ensure a correct balance between cameras being used 
by police and all other cameras.   
 The current ‗pan tilt and zoom‘ (PTZ) technology cannot be used for 
different purposes by a variety of users at the same time, in that there is a 
need for technical requirements as well as technical advancements 
designed to allow for multiple purpose use - at minimal costs. 
 Recommendations between the police and criminal justice system about 
what CCTV systems need to be able to achieve for investigation, 
detection, and prosecution requirements. 
 Development of a mapping system to determine where the cameras are 
and to identify any weaknesses in coverage. This should be done in 
conjunction with national intelligence systems designed with threat 
assessment, crime hot spot, serious crime, terrorism, and specific financial 
or strategic locations in mind. This would need to be done nationally in 
order to have the best strategic value. 
 Local CCTV owners and operators should be expected to develop and 
implement job profiles, standard operating procedures and guidance 
documents, key performance indicators, model business cases, and 
stakeholder mapping interfaces. These local documents could also serve to 
supplement and compliment those of the police.  
 Sharing of best practices, standards, case management, and operational 
procedures among stakeholders to avoid duplication while ensuring 
consistency of practice. 
 Extend the jurisdiction of town centre CCTV systems to monitor railway, 
commuter stations, and, where possible, on-board buses and trains.  
Extension could later branch further to shopping malls, sport stadiums, 
and public street systems leading to an extensive hub of public space 
CCTV.  This expanded system would be done in conjunction the local 
authorities (National CCTV Strategy, 2007). 
Beyond the development of guidelines, other important elements of program 
management are measurement, assessment, and evaluation. In the IACP survey (2001), 
agencies were asked if they had measurement systems in place designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their CCTV systems. ―Ninety-six percent of respondents do not 
incorporate measurement systems of any kind. Despite the lack of measurement systems, 
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when asked about the effectiveness of CCTV, the overall response indicated that there 
had been marked improvements in police operations (IACP, 2001: 5).  
Key components of an evaluation plan which are often easily overlooked are an 
understanding of specific management details or incidents, and an understanding of their 
potential effects on the overall system. For example, details and implications specific to 
technical setbacks, delays, differences in equipment requirements, policies and 
procedures of tape storage and handling, and differences in the installation process will 
all have an effect on a CCTV system, yet may not be a consideration within the formal 
evaluation plan. Details specific to the control room operations, including qualifications 
and training of operators, management approaches, and scheduling, will also have an 
effect on the system and should be considered part of the evaluation process. Every 
CCTV system and its placement should be planned and designed according to its 
intended use.  Additionally, an understanding and measurement of what is expected from 
the system, and a plan to achieve and measure these expectations should be incorporated 
into an evaluation plan. Cost and financial assessment considerations should also be 
measured as part of the overall evaluation strategy (Gill and Spriggs, 2005). 
In summary, the effective management of CCTV programs faces several challenges 
including: unifying the development of technology and programs to ensure ease and 
facilitation of information sharing across law enforcement agencies and intra-national 
boundaries; consistent and updated training of CCTV personnel; the development of 
public evaluation/surveys; and site-specific, controlled studies.  Researchers of CCTV 
have attempted to address these needs, yet the findings and support for or against such 
systems continues to be mixed. Insofar as the public‘s role is concerned, it is important 
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for law enforcement agencies, local government, and community members to increase the 
level of public involvement in understanding CCTV for what it can and cannot do. This 
would assist in ensuring that decisions specific to implementation or non-implementation 
of CCTV are founded in evidence-based knowledge, education, and realistic expectations 
associated with the evidence. As an example of this need, Maguire (2004) argued that the 
Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) in Britain began its course with every intention of 
ensuring its development would be based on solid research and that its evolution would 
occur according to the outcomes and measurement of these outcomes. However, because 
of a number of pressures, it was unable to follow through entirely on this goal. Instead, it 
was ―sold to politicians as contributing to the government‘s challenging crime reduction 
targets, an aim which progressively took priority over research.  It was over-ambitious in 
scale and raised unrealistic expectations of its outcomes‖ (Maguire, 2004: 213). As part 
of this original intent, the British government allocated 10% of its original CRP budget to 
evaluations with the goal that these be completed by external researchers. The 
government also noted, that each and every project would be evaluated. Unfortunately, 
this did not happen. If this research had been done, we would all benefit from a vast 
amount of research on a variety of interventions and would likely have a greater 
understanding of ‗best practices‘ specific to CCTV program development and design.  To 
this end, the importance of program evaluation and measurement cannot be understated. 
A commitment must be made to public safety at the onset of all programs and 
interventions. Value must be placed on the importance of research and evidence-based 
decision making for all phases of program development, including policy development 
through to practice. As well, in order to achieve the most comprehensive and accurate 
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program evaluation, a program must run for a sufficient period of time. Using the case of 
Britain‘s Crime Reduction Programme, the initial plan was for the CRP program to run 
for a 10 year period with the intention of allowing for a process of testing, learning and 
feedback, and a staggered ‗rollout‘ in which identified cost-effective interventions would 
gradually be implemented on a broader scale (Maguire, 2004: 217).  Unfortunately, due 
to the high political profile raised by the need to ‗sell‘ the idea for the CRP to politicians, 
the programme was subjected to considerable scrutiny and political attention.  In this 
way, the elevated expectations, high level of scrutiny, and an ambitious schedule made 
the program vulnerable to a desire for quick results, often influenced by the electoral 
cycle (Maguire, 2004; 217). Ideally, if a program could be implemented and managed 
without political interference or influence, it would likely result in a more successfully 
managed and more objectively evaluated intervention.  
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Chapter Six:  Recommendations and Conclusion 
Throughout North America and Europe, policing agencies, governments, and 
private sector interest groups have been looking increasingly to the development and 
implementation of CCTV technology to address specific issues of public safety, fear of 
crime, and perceptions of social disorder. As noted in the introduction, Bournemouth, a 
city in the UK, became the first to implement a permanent public CCTV camera in 1985 
(McCahill and Norris, 2002). CCTV began to gradually spread to other towns and cities 
throughout the UK over the following decade and, by the end of the 1990‘s, over 500 
monitoring systems were in place. ―Recent estimates indicate that 800 publicly funded 
systems are operational, supporting more than 40,000 public cameras across the UK.‖ 
(Hier et al., 2007: 728). This technology currently serves a variety of purposes including 
addressing troubled downtown business districts, deterring and apprehending offenders in 
criminally active public housing communities, increasing safety or feelings of safety in 
public spaces, such as in parks and on streets, traffic monitoring, and assisting in the 
decision making of infrastructure planning (IACP Executive Brief, 2001).  
While CCTV has evolved as a program to address concerns of crime, it has not 
consistently proven to actually work. Inconsistencies, contradictions, or minimal effects 
have been found in the evaluation of open street camera surveillance systems. Yet, CCTV 
is often being turned to as the answer when a crisis or spike in crime occurs. Political 
influences and cases involving high profile publicity have contributed to the 
implementation of CCTV systems, instead of  research and evidence. While Britain has 
led the way in terms of the implementation of CCTV for crime control purposes, CCTV 
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is increasingly becoming the popular choice in many countries and is often relied upon 
for the impression it gives that something is being done to address the issues, especially 
in high profile cases (Norris et al., 2004). Importantly, public perception of CCTV, 
especially insofar as the invasion of privacy is concerned, influences its successful 
implementation. The IACP survey (2001), as well as the Home Office study in the UK 
entitled ―Police Attitudes To and Use of CCTV‖ (Levesley and Martin, 2005), suggested 
that the overall success of any plan to carry out an effective CCTV program was largely 
dependent on public acceptance. The programs which have succeeded to date tended to 
be in locations where there were no expectations of privacy or where privacy had been 
voluntarily surrendered, such as in airports (International Association of Chiefs of Police 
Executive Brief, 2001). ―Taking into account the reported success of CCTV thus far and 
the avoidance of infringing on citizen‘s privacy, police agencies and city and county 
governments will likely continue to explore what CCTV can do to increase the 
effectiveness of law enforcement‖ (International Association of Chiefs of Police 
Executive Brief, 2001: 13). CCTV could provide real benefits if the technology was used 
and directed correctly, taking into account the new threats to privacy that arise with new 
advances in viewing capabilities. ―Improving the quality of CCTV images will support 
the development of current, complimentary technologies such as Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition (ANPR) and future technologies such as facial recognition‖ (National 
CCTV Strategy, 2007: 8). 
Video surveillance in public spaces puts everyone under scrutiny, whether they 
have done something wrong or not.  This, in itself, is an important argument for many 
proponents of CCTV who argue that, if you have done nothing wrong, there should be no 
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problem.  Privacy specialists argued, however, that on-going public scrutiny through the 
use of public space CCTV eradicates the expectation of privacy and anonymity that 
citizens in a free society have become accustomed to and which are promoted as a 
cornerstone of a democratic society. In an effort to accommodate both sides of the CCTV 
argument, the Canadian guidelines were developed and printed in March 2006 to ensure 
effective yet constitutionally lawful, CCTV systems are developed and managed in 
Canada. The primary 15 recommended guidelines as noted in Chapter Four, are 
recommended for consideration to ensure that the use of CCTV technology is 
implemented, maintained, and managed according to a respectful awareness of privacy 
considerations. 
Overall, it is recognized that the UK is a leader in the development of the 
implementation of CCTV, and, most recently, they have emerged as leaders to ensure that 
CCTV standards are developed and adhered to. For this reason, it is recommended that 
the model of implementation and the guideline criteria developed in the UK be 
understood and seriously considered for use by all agencies contemplating CCTV 
implementation. Also, as a result of the complexities surrounding the issues of privacy 
and human rights, the Constitution Project in the U.S. has also developed a 
comprehensive document entitled ―Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance – a Guide to 
Protecting Communities and Preserving Civil Liberties‖, the details of which should also 
be reviewed and considered for use by all those considering the implementation of CCTV 
in public spaces. Each of these recommended documents - the Canadian Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner Guidelines, the UK National Standards guide, and the American 
Guide to Protecting Communities and Preserving Civil Liberties, recognized the need for 
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on-going and open communication, consultation, program evaluation, and partnership 
development.  More and more recognition is being made in favour of rational and 
evidence-based decision making in crime prevention and deterrence program 
implementation and practice. Yet until recently, crime prevention programs had often 
been put in place or have continued to operate without strong evidence that they actually 
worked to achieve their intended goals.  In the National Crime Prevention Centre of 
Canada‘s research report published in 2007, an overview of scientific trends, results, and 
implications for Canada was completed which outlined several considerations as having 
an influence on the selection, maintenance, expansion, or termination of crime prevention 
programs. Some of these influences included changing government priorities, as well as 
politician‘s short time horizons. Despite these complications in the past, the emerging 
trend toward evidence-based decision making in crime prevention is beginning to take 
hold.  Support for evidence-based crime prevention is growing as a result of a number of 
key influences, including the move towards evidence decision making in other 
disciplines, such as medicine, as well as the development of large scale reports in a 
variety of fields on ―what works‖. While this trend is on the rise and may help to simplify 
decisions specific to crime control programs and interventions, the questions surrounding 
CCTV remain complicated. Gill and Spriggs (2005) summarized the complexity of the 
issues of CCTV very well by stating: 
Too much must not be expected of CCTV. It is more than just a technical 
solution; it requires human intervention to work to maximum efficiency and the 
problems it helps deal with are complex. It has potential, if properly managed, 
often alongside other measures, and in response to specific problems, to reduce 
crime and to boost the public‘s feeling of safety; and it can generate other 
benefits. For these to be achieved though, there needs to be greater recognition 
that reducing and preventing crime is not easy and that, ill-conceived solutions are 
unlikely to work no matter what the investment (Gill and Spriggs, 2005: 121). 
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Implicit in the acceptance of the complexities associated with CCTV and its use as a tool 
to assist in creating safe streets is the direction and recognition of the need for future 
research and study on the effectiveness of CCTV.
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